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Abstract
The use of information technology in electric power grid introduces the vulnerability prob-
lem looming the future smart grid. The supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
is the first defense, which itself is undermined by potential malicious attacks. This disserta-
tion studies two particular security threats facing the smart grid and SCADA systems: the
unobservable attack and the replay attack. The former is well known in fault detection of
the power grid and has received renewed interest in the past a few years, while the latter
is motivated by the Stuxnet worm allegedly used against the nuclear facilities in Iran. For
unobservable attacks, this dissertation adopts the dynamic state estimation approach and
treats each bus of the power grid as a dynamic agent. A consensus estimation strategy is
proposed to estimate the dynamic states of the power grid, based on which unobservable
attacks can be effectively detected. Detection of replay attacks is harder. Two different ap-
proaches are proposed in this dissertation. The first is the whitening filter approach that
converts the detection of the replay attack into an equivalent white noise detection through
whitening a feedback signal. However this approach is less effective, if the replay attack does
not change much the whiteness of the filtered feedback signal. Hence a second approach
termed as spectrum estimation is proposed. It is shown that the spectrum of the feedback
signal in presence of the replay attack can be very different from the case when the replay
attack is absent. This approach improves the detection results of the former one. Both are
illustrated and examined by the simulation studies.
viii
1 Introduction
Smart grid is a future power grid for which the supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) system will play a crucial role in monitoring and controlling the power grid. In
fact SCADA systems are already widely used in many different industries, including electric
power systems. According to [3], a SCADA system used for power grid provides 100 ∼ 200
voltage/current measurement samples per second, enabling real time monitoring and control
for power grid. Because of its effectiveness, the SCADA system is now an essential component
of the power grid, and an indispensable part of the future smart grid. SCADA now becomes
an enabling technology vital to the smart grid.
Notwithstanding advantages of the SCADA system, it also brings some drawbacks. Due
to many sites over large distance and use of information technology, especially wireless com-
munications and networking, SCADA systems give rise to the security problem enticing the
vulnerability of the smart grid which becomes more and more serious, endangering the safety
of our national infrastructures, including the power grids. This dissertation is focused on this
looming security problem for the future safety of the smart grid, and endeavors to provide
some viable solution approaches to tackle this difficult problem.
In this chapter we will give a brief introduction of smart grid, emphasizing the advantages
and also potential problems facing the smart grid. The security issues in the smart grid will
be described subsequently. Based on the background information on smart grid and secu-
rity issues, we will present our dissertation research from signal/system models to existing
methods and to our proposed solutions.
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This dissertation is organized as follows. The first chapter will provide an introduction to
the smart grid covering both of its advantages and the challenges it faces. Since the security is
the theme of this dissertation, we will give more detailed description on the looming security
problem facing the smart grid. Our dissertation will be focused on two particular types of
malicious attacks against the smart grid with one termed as unobservable attacks, and the
other called replay attacks. Both have received great attention in the research community
[4, 2, 5, 6, 7, 8]. Unfortunately the existing detection methods are not very effective and each
has its drawbacks. For this reason, we undertake our research on these two different attacks.
In Chapter 2, we propose a dynamic state estimation approach to detection of the unob-
servable attacks. The novelty of our proposed approach lies in the consensus estimation by
treating each bus as a dynamic agent. Although it requires dynamic modeling of the power
grid, the estimation results are far superior to the static state estimation currently em-
ployed. More importantly unobservable attacks are not unobservable anymore, and they can
be effectively detected demonstrated by both our theoretical results and simulation studies.
The replay attack is a more serous threat to the smart grid. Two chapters of this disser-
tation are devoted to detection of the replay attack. Chapter 3 is focused on the whitening
filter approach, while Chapter 4 is focused on the spectral estimation approach. Replay at-
tacks are motivated by the Stuxnet worm that is allegedly brought down the Iranian nuclear
program. However it also opens a door to attacks against industrial infrastructures such as
power grid. Mo and Sinopoli [9, 2] are the first to study the replay attack via injecting a
Gauss white noise to the control input signal. However their approach is limited to Linear
Quadratic Gaussian (LQG) feedback control systems. In addition the injected noise deterio-
rates the control performance. Although several papers followed to address the performance
deterioration issue, injection of the noise to the feedback system remains. We propose to
make use of the communication noises that exist in the SCADA system induced by the net-
work channels without injecting noises to the system, and demonstrate the effectiveness of
2
our proposed two approaches. Our dissertation is concluded in Chapter 4 that highlights the
contribution of this dissertation, and outlines the future direction in security research for
smart grid.
1.1 Introduction to Smart Grid
In this section, issues in the power grid and advantages of smart grid will be elaborated
based on the available literature.
1.1.1 Issues facing the power grid
The power system has been evolved for more than one hundred years. With its devel-
opment and extension, at present in the United States, the power system has more than
14,000 transmission substations and 4,500 large distribution substations, which make it the
most complex electric infrastructure in the world. However, as time pass by, the electric
infrastructure is aging, outmoded, underfunded and over stressed today. Right now, we are
using the 19th century system from the days of Edison and the 20th century equipments by
Westinghouse to keep up with a 21st century economy [10]. The power industry is facing
great challenges and compelled to solve many important issues which are discussed next.
• Efficiency Issue: Our power grid has served us for many years. Approximately 70 per-
cent of the transformers and transmission lines are 25 years old, and 60 percent of the
circuit breakers are 30 or more years old [11]. The resistance in the transmission lines
increases as the power grid is ageing. Consequently, more power is lost in the grid in
form of heat. Since the power grid keeps expansion, and has become more complex and
larger than before, it becomes increasingly difficult to access the status and informa-
tion of the power system. To make sure that there is enough power to satisfy all the
customers’ energy demand, utility companies always have to generate excess power to
have adequate margin in meeting the power needs. Therefore, the excessive power is
thrown away in the grid. As a result, all the customers have to pay for the waste. In
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addition it is harder to optimize the power delivery due to the increased complexity and
wide spread of the power grid. Right now, the entire power infrastructure in the U.S. is
managed by about 130 control centers. These centers are isolated and operated blindly
to each other. So, they cannot effectively cooperate with each other, which results in
low efficiency for power delivery [10]. For example, it is possible for some regions to
have high power demand, but there are no enough power plants to generate enough
power to meet the power demand. While in some other regions, the power companies
generate excess power to meet the customers’ peak energy demand in that area which
is often wasted. As a result, it leads to the lack of power in some regions while wasting
power in some other regions. Hence the issue of low efficiency of the power delivery
needs to be tackled. Moreover the booming of the renewable energy and its applica-
tion (of hybrid vehicles) provide new energy sources. There is no reason that the wind
power in Texas cannot be balanced and mixed with hydropower in Washington State.
However the existing power grids are not well prepared for these new power sources.
How to effectively use these new energy sources becomes more urgent than before.
• High Cost Issue: The cost for producing electricity in the daytime is much more expen-
sive than its cost in night. In fact the peak electricity demand can be 100 times more
costly to produce [10]. Since power companies cannot control the customers’ usage of
electricity power, most customers are using power in the daytime with high cost. Thus,
it costs a lot to produce the electricity power. Also, to satisfy the maximum power
requirement in the peak time, power plant has to keep hot standby, which means that
the power plant has to consume coal or fossil fuel to keep generator running at the
synchronous speed even when there is no high power demand. If more power plants
are built today, then the cost of hot standby will increase significantly. Because of the
shortage of fossil fuel and coal, it is urgent to consider new ways to reduce the high
cost in producing electricity.
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• Reliability Issue: With the power grid extension and ongoing interconnections, the
complexity of the power system has increased worldwide. At the same time, there are
still many aging transmission lines and devices on duty. As such the power system
becomes more difficult to control than before, and thus more susceptible to failures,
even the catastrophic failures. For example, in a short span of two months in 2003, there
were several blackouts around the world and affected a number of customers [12, 13, 14];
On August 14, 2003, in Northeast United States and Canada, the blackouts affected
approximately 50 million people. It took over a day to recover power to New York City
and other affected areas. It is considered as one of the worst blackouts in the history
of these countries; On August 28, 2003, in London, the blackouts affected commutes
during the rush hour and caused an approximately 50-minute loss of power supply
to about 20% of the London demand (734MW); On September 23, 2003, in Sweden
and Denmark, the blackout affected about 5 million people. The power supply was
restored after 5 hours to most of the customers; On September 28, 2003, in Italy, the
blackout affected about 57 million people. The power restored to major cities after 5-9
hours. It is considered the worst blackout in Europe. So far as it is reported, the worst
blackout was in India happened just on July 31, 2012, spreading to more than half
the country. It left more than 600 million people in northern and eastern India out of
power. This is considered as the worst on the earth. The reason for the blackout lies in
the increased complexity of the power system and unstable aging devices. It increases
the difficulty of system-wide coordination of back up protection and also causes more
disturbances due to the high sensitivity of these aging devices. Although the blackouts
are still the small probability events, they are always associated with huge expenses
to power utilities and customers. Thus now is the time for us to pay more attention
to the reliability issue. As just described above, power system has been developed for
more than a hundred years. But there is no significant change in the past one hundred
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years. Our electric grid is still using electro-mechanics from the 1960s and 70s rather
than microprocessors in the digital age today. As the power system keeps expansion
and grows to more complex, some problems which seem very minor in the past become
extremely urgent today. Hence it is necessary to make an evolution to the power grid
which can encounter these problems. And it will be a vast, interconnected, intelligent
system that is monitored and controlled end to end-all the way down to billions of
individual devices. That is the smart grid that is going to be the next generation
power grid.
1.1.2 Advantages of smart grid
This subsection introduces the smart grid and answers the basic question such as what
smart grid is and what benefits it can offer to us [12, 13, 14, 10, 11].
Figure 1.1: Conceptual model for smart grid
Roughly speaking, smart grid is a new generation power grid that uses optimized control
algorithm, smart meters, networking and communications infrastructure that are embedded
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in residences, companies, factories and throughout the power distribution grid. It is an in-
telligent and interactive power grid which provides customers and the grid the ability to
monitor and regulate energy consumption comprehensively in real time. It is an evolution of
the power grid. People will benefit more from its application.
The smart grid offers the following advantages.
• More efficiency and low cost: With the installation of smart meters and the inter-
connection between customers and utility companies, utility companies can frequently
gather data from customers by smart meters. Also, customers can easily and timely get
their usage information. It makes the power grid a two-way interactive grid. With the
interactivity, power companies are able to estimate the energy demand in the power
grid more precisely and regulate the power supply in real time. So, there is no need
to generate excessive power any more, which reduces the power waste in the grid and
maximizes the power supply efficiency while still guards against power grid overload.
Figure 1.2: Schematic illustration of power usage change
Recall that in the peak loads time excessive energy is very expensive due to the fact
that large amount usage of the power is from thermal power plants which use expensive
coal and natural gas as the fuel. Also, with the application of smart grid, time-based
pricing are going to be feasible. Customers will be provided the fluctuated utility price
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which changes according to the fuel consumption in real time. So they can adjust their
power usage according to the real time price. Therefore, it will change the customers’
power usage habits. As shown in Fig. 1.2, these power usage habit changes will reduce
the peak demand and shift part of power usages to the low price time period, which
reduces the total cost of power generation and save money for customers.
• More reliable, more green: In the smart grid, with the application of advanced control
algorithms, and fast system state feedback, the power grid becomes more reliable. It
can handle a wide variety of power sources and storage systems while also maintaining
stability. Keep in mind that the renewable energy such as solar and wind are always
fluctuating. In the past, it was difficult to coordinate renewable energy with the power
grid. But in smart grid, due to its fast regulating ability, the renewable energy can be
easily connected to the power grid and coordinated with other distributed power plants
to increase the power supply redundancy. Thus it encourages more renewable energy
to be used in the power generation, which reduces the greenhouse gas emission and
makes power generation more environment friendly. Meanwhile with the increasing use
of hybrid vehicles and electric vehicles, smart grid is able to coordinate these vehicles
to serve as batteries and backup power for the grid, which makes the power grid more
robust in presence of the fluctuate demand impact from customers. With the interactive
ability, the control center can coordinate the power usage of customers so as to reduce
the adverse impact to the power grid. For example, in factories, many machines contain
large numbers of motors. The start current of a motor is 5 ∼ 7 times as normal. If these
machines start at the same time, the start current will have a huge impact to the grid.
To reduce this kind of impacts, factories have to invest a lot of money on upgrading the
infrastructure. But in the smart grid, control center can intelligently control the start
sequence of machines, which will reduce the total start current so as to minimize the
impact to the grid. As a result it will also save the cost of infrastructure investment.
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And with the fast response ability and application of advanced control algorithm, the
smart grid can react quickly to any of the power fluctuation in grid and coordinate
the power generation and distribution, and protection of customer activities. Thus, the
stability margin of the smart grid will be increased, which increases the ability to resist
disturbance and reduces the chance of black out in the grid. Thus, the smart grid is
more reliable, robust, highly efficient and having low cost.
1.2 Security Issues in Smart Grid
It is important to point out that as a coin has two sides, smart grid also brings some new
problems. The most imminent one is the potential security issue emerging in the smart grid.
As shown in Fig. 1, with the wide use of smart meters, network and communications infras-
tructure that are embedded in residences, companies, factories and throughout the power
distribution grid, the supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system becomes
more complex and interconnected. The connections between smart meters and control net-
works as well as Internet make the smart grid more vulnerable to penetration. The increased
size and complexity of the power grid networks provide plenty potential intrusion nodes. Ma-
licious devices might be inadvertently infiltrated inside the trusted networks by personnel.
Devices used both inside and outside of the trusted networks can be infected with malware
when used outside, and infiltrate that malware when used inside the trusted networks. Also,
the components of the IT infrastructure with susceptibilities or wrong configurations may
lead to back doors and holes in the network. Networking devices in the trusted network can
be taken control for bypassing proper protocol. Moreover, adversaries can take advantage
of the susceptibilities of the devices and setup back doors for future access to the center
control network which is the core of the smart grid. There are wide variety motivations for
adversaries to launch attacks on the smart grid. Some of attacks are for economic reasons
like reducing the utility fee bills. Some of the attacks might be just the pranks. While some
of the attacks are for very serious terrorism reasons. Terrorists might attack the power grid
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to threaten people by taking control of electricity and other life-critical resources. For ex-
ample, terrorists can take control of the smart meter to send fake data to the control center
so as to mislead the control center to make a wrong action to the power grid. These wrong
actions may mess up the electricity delivery and cause huge impact to the power grid, which
reduce its stability and reliability or even cause serious consequences. Some of the relays
may frequently close and open when they are not required to do that. Generators might be
burned during the frequently trip off and synchronous with the power grid. Nuclear plants
might be threatened not by the bomb but by the huge oscillation in the grid. Terrorists
may shut down the electricity in some areas for their next step of the terrorism action. Or
they may make blackout in the power grid, which may influence large number of areas like
industries, traffic, communication or hospitals. These attacks will cause serious impacts to
people’s life and homeland security. Also people’s privacy information might be robbed by
attackers for future crime purpose. So the reasons for adversaries to attack the smart grid
are various, which increase the vulnerability of the smart grid. Thus security of the smart
grid is an urgent research problem facing our nation.
There are various kinds of adversary actions in the smart grid today. Once the adversaries
gain access to the power control network, they can perform a wide range of attacks. And
these attacks will lead to both cyber and physical aftermaths. For the cyber aftermaths, they
can be specified as follows [9, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23]:
• Malware spreading and controlling devices: attackers can write some malware programs
and spread them to control center and smart meters. Once the device or system is
infected by the malware, adversaries can use the malware to change or modify some
functions in the device or system such as taking control of the device or sending false
information.
• Vulnerabilities in common protocols: in the smart grid, communication between com-
ponents will be based on existing protocols which inherit the vulnerabilities. Common
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protocols may include TCP/IP and remote procedure call (PRC). Attackers can access
the control system network by investigating these vulnerabilities in protocols.
• Access through database links: the database on the control system network records the
power system activities, which also mirror logs into the business network. The improp-
erly configured modern database architectures will be attacked by skilled attackers.
They can access to the database on the business network which gives a path to the
control system network.
• Modbus security issues: The SCADA system uses the Modbus protocol as the com-
munication protocol. As the Modbus is a simple client-server protocol, it is originally
designed for low-speed serial communications in process control network. Thus, it was
not designed for high-security-critical environments. Therefore, several attacks can be
launched. These include broadcast message spoofing, baseline response replay, direct
slave control, Modbus network scanning, passive reconnaissance and rogue interloper.[9]
• Eavesdropping attacks: adversaries can gather sensitive information by monitoring the
network communication between smarts components. They will use the information
for future crime activities such as stealing power usage, disclosure of the controlling
structure of smart grids.
• Injecting false information on price and meter data: by compromising the smart meters
and communication equipment, adversaries can inject false information to the control
center, such as false price and meter data. This fake information can result in negative
price, power shortage or many other significant damages to the public. In addition, it
will produce huge financial impacts on electricity markets [5].
For the physical aftermaths, they are specified as follow [7, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28]:
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• Interception of SCADA frames: attackers can intercept SCADA Distributed Network
Protocol 3.0 (DNP3) frames and gather unencrypted plain text frames by using a pro-
tocol analysis tool for sniffing network traffic. This intercepted data includes control
and configuration information. It can be used in future on another SCADA system or
intelligent equipment device, so as to shut down or disrupt service. Malware targeting
industrial control system: attackers can inject worms into control systems and recon-
figure control system settings. A well-known example is the computer worms called
Stuxnet in 2010 [29]. It is the first known worms which specifically target at SCADA
systems and had been infect thousands of computers worldwide.
• DoS/DDoS attacks on networks and servers: attackers can launch DoS/DDoS attacks
against various power grid components such as smart meters, communication infras-
tructures, and utility business servers. Once they successfully attack these components,
the electricity will not be able to control in the target region and power supply might
be shut down as the result of the attack.
• Sending fake commands to smart meters in a region: adversaries can send fake command
or data to devices in a target region so as to make them do wrong action. They
can send disconnect command to some relays in the target region to stop the power
delivery in that area. Or they can make invalid switching of electric devices to result in
unsafe connections. These may cause the target place burn on fire. Thus, the unsecured
communication may threaten people’s life.
• Aurora attack: This kind of attacks came out and caught engineers’ eye in 2007. The
intent of the Aurora attack is to intentionally open a breaker and close it out of
synchronism to cause damage to connected power system devices such as generators,
motors and transformers. When an out-of-synchronism close is initiated, the resulting
high electrical current and torque will translate to the twist stress on the mechanical
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shaft of rotating equipment. This kind of twist stress will reduce the life of the rotating
equipment and even possibly destroy it.[30]
The above discussion shows the importance of the smart grid security. These security
issues need to be resolved before the smart grid can be operated successfully. My research
will focus on the cyber-physical security which will be outlined in the next section.
1.3 Dissertation Research
Per our discussion in the previous section, there exist various potential adversary actions
in the smart grid, which reveal the vulnerability of the smart grid. Possible attack actions
can be separated into two groups and thus pose two major challenges. One is to take control
of the target region computer for future crime actions. These attack actions are based on
the cyber system, which can be solved by recent cyber security approaches. The other is to
modify the data or injecting malicious data into the control system, which can bypass the
cyber security. Hence the existing security approaches are inadequate to address the second
challenge. It is important to observe that in the smart grid, the core of a monitoring and
control system lies in the critical task of state estimation. Plenty of distributed measurements
over the power grid are used to keep tracking of the current grid state. The accuracy of the
measurement data is essential for maintaining stability and preventing disruption. Because
many of the measurement data come from various meters distributed in the power grid and
there are always some bad data measurements due to the fault of meters, fault detection
techniques are often employed in early research. Power system researchers have developed
many techniques for processing the data in order to eliminate the bad data measurement
[31]. These techniques first detect if there are bad measurement data, and then identify and
remove them.
In early time, researchers considered only false data. However the advent of smart grid
has brought in potential attacks that inject malicious data into measurement data. It is
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entirely possible for attackers to compromise meters and to introduce false data. Later on
it is realized that the existing false data detection techniques can also detect the malicious
measurements injected by adversaries. This is because all the existing data detection tech-
niques rely on the same assumption that the square of the difference between observed
measurements and their corresponding estimates will significantly increase if there are bad
data measurements [32]. Unfortunately this assumption is not always true. It is possible to
bypass the existing detection techniques by attackers if they know the configuration of the
power grid. Attackers can systematically generate bad data measurements so as to bypass
the bad data measurement detection techniques without increasing the square of the error
between observed measurements and their corresponding estimates. Such attacks are called
unobservable. For this reason there is an urgent need to develop new methods for detection
of the unobservable malicious data injected by attackers. This is one of main focuses of our
dissertation research.
Another devastating and deceiving attack is the replay attack. Stuxnet worm is a prime
example. While being used initially to counter the Iran nuclear program allegedly [33] the
Stuxnet worm opens the door to malicious attackers. So long as attackers have remote
access to sensing and actuation devices, they are able to modify the software or reprogram
the devices to launch coordinated attacks against the system infrastructure without being
detected virtually by the underlying SCADA system until it is too late. Specifically replay
attacks assume that the sensing data are secretely recorded by the attacker using software,
which are then replayed back to the SCADA system while conducting the attack on the
physical system. The deception created by replay is often seen in movies and spy fictions. It
is now possible to deploy the replay attack through Stuxnet worm without being virtually
detected by the SCADA – a nightmare to the SCADA. A solution approach as proposed in
[2] injects a known independently identically distributed (i.i.d.) zero-mean Gaussian noise
into the control input serving as the authentication signal. Assuming LQG control systems,
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a χ2 detector is used to detect the presence of the replay attack. It is shown in [2] that in
presence of the replay attack, the normalized error covariance of the innovation signal of the
Kalman filter deviates from the identity with a higher variance dependent on the variance of
the injected noise or the authentication signal. As its variance increases, the detection rate
improves but the control performance suffers. There exists a tradeoff between the detection
rate and loss of the control performance in terms of the variance of the authentication
signal. A method is proposed in [34] for designing the covariance of the authentication signal
to minimize the performance loss while guaranteeing a certain probability of detection rate.
The proposed method is demonstrated with an application to security for micro-grids. A
different approach is taken in [1] by switching the LQG controller between the one with no
added noise and the one with added noise. Results from noncooperative stochastic game are
used to minimize the worst-case control and detection cost.
Replay attacks represent another potentially lethal threat to the smart grid. Although
the method proposed in [2] and studied in [34, 1] provide effective detection algorithms,
injecting noise deteriorates serious by the performance of the smart grid, because the noise
variance has to be large enough in order to be effective for detecting the replay attack. So the
research for replay attacks is far from over, and is the focus of this dissertation research. In
the next two subsections, we provide more detailed description for these two major attacks
threatening the future smart grid.
1.3.1 Signal and system models
This subsection presents signal and system models for the unobservable attacks. The replay
attack is too complex to be included, which is delayed to Chapter 3.
In the power system, electricity is generated from power plant and transmitted to the load
centers by transmission lines, the load centers then distribute the electricity to customers
by the distribution system enabled by power lines. Control center monitors and controls the
power system working in order. Monitoring the power system status is very important in
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keeping the system reliability. To make sure that the power system continues to work well
even in presence of faults, power engineers use meters to monitor system components and
transmit the meter data to the control center. Fig. 1.3 shows an IEEE 14-bus test system that
is one of the commonly used power system models. In this system, each bus and transmission
line is equipped with Current Transformers (CTs) and Power/Voltage Transformers (PTs).
These CTs and PTs feedback signals to meters so that meters can provide current and
voltage signals to the control center. In the control center, the server can gather all the data
from these meters and use them to calculate the power system status.
Figure 1.3: IEEE 14-bus test system
Denote N (µ,Σ) as normal distribution with mean µ and covariance Σ. We assume lin-
earized measurement model of the power grid described by [29]
z = Hx+ v, v ∼ N (0, R) (1.1)
where z of sizem is the power system state that the control center calculated, x of size n is the
data vector from meters, and H of dimension m×n is the measurement matrix. The system
state includes the power flow, power load or any states that the control center wants by
computing the data from meters. The data vector includes current, voltage, power angle and
any other data that meters can directly provide. The system matrix depends on the topology
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of the power grid, the parameters of the transmission lines, and the distribution of CTs and
PTs. The vector v represents the measurement noise, assumed to be normal distributed with
mean zero and diagonal covariance matrix R. Commonly m > n is assumed in order to have
redundancy in the measurement so that it has the ability to protect against the bad data
which may come from failure or breakdown of meters. The existing estimation techniques rely
on three statistical estimation criteria applied to state estimation: the maximum likelihood
criterion, the weighted least-square criterion, and the minimum variance criterion [35]. These
criteria lead to an identical estimator with the optimal solution given by
xˆ = (HTR−1H)−1HTR−1z, R = diag(σ21 , σ
2
1, · · · , σ2m). (1.2)
Due to various reasons such as meter failures and malicious attacks, bad measurements
can be resulted in. Various detection methods have been developed to ensure the success of
state estimation [36, 35, 37, 38, 23, 39, 40, 41]. Clearly normal meter measurements always
provide acceptable accuracy for estimation of the state variables which are close to their
actual values, while abnormal meters may shift the estimated state variables away from
the true value. To prevent the estimation from bad measurements, measurement residual
z−Hxˆ is always calculated, and its Euclidean-norm ‖z−Hxˆ‖ is used to detect the presence
of bad measurements. For instance ‖z − Hxˆ‖ can be compared with a threshold τ , and
if ‖z − Hxˆ‖ > τ , then a bad measurement exists [31]. Many researchers have studied the
problem of bad measurements detection and identification in power system [42, 43, 44, 45,
46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52]. However, all of them use the same inequality ‖z − Hxˆ‖ ≶ τ to
detect the existence of bad measurements. It is important to point out that a smart attacker
can systematically bypass this detection method.
To attack the system, adversaries often inject wrong data to the power system instead of
the true measurements, leading to the signal model
za = z + a = Hx+ v + a (1.3)
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where za is the data collected by control center, a is the vector of the injected attack data
added to the original measurements. Denote xˆa and xˆ the estimates of x using the malicious
measurement za and the original measurement z, respectively. We have xˆa = xˆ+ c where c
is a nonzero vector of length n and represents estimation error injected by the adversary. It
is shown in [31] that if the adversary can find a c ∈ Rn such that
a = Hc, za = Hx+ v + a = H(x+ c) + v, (1.4)
then the measurement residual of za is equal to that of z, and the attack will not change the
residuals of the measurement. Indeed there holds
‖za −Hxˆa‖ = ‖z + a−H(xˆ+ c)‖ = ‖z −Hxˆ‖. (1.5)
As a result, the attack is able to bypass the bad measurement detection. For this reason,
such attacks are termed “unobservable”. By ignoring the measurement noise, the SCADA
will believe that x+ c is the true data from meters. It is possible to protect the measurement
meters and their signal transmission routes in order to prevent adversaries from changing
the value from meters. However, in the real world, due to the high cost and difficulties
of management, only a small set of meters can be protected. Therefore it is possible for
adversaries to launch attacks from the unprotected devices without altering the measurement
or estimation residual. On the other hand, attackers may not know the actually system
information, and they cannot find the proper c vector to make a = Hc. In this situation,
attacks are very similar to bad measurements.
1.3.2 Existing methods
For the observable attacks, many existing detection methods can be used, including gen-
eralized likelihood ratio test (GLRT) [4], largest normalized residue test (LNRT) [53], J(xˆ)
detector [51]. The LNRT and J(xˆ) detectors are two classical bad data detectors. They were
often used to test bad measurements in the past when the sample size is small. The GLRT
18
performs better than the previous two methods when the sample size is large. However, the
best and powerful detector dose not exist. There are always pros and cons for any detector.
For instance the computation and memory complexities of GLRT may increase due to the
high sparsity condition of the attack vector a [4]. There thus exist tradeoffs between the
detection performance and complexity including the sparsity level.
For the unobservable attacks, it is much more challenge to detect than the observable
attack. Recently the graph-theoretic method is suggested to prevent the unobservable attack
[4]. This method is aimed to prevent the smallest unobservable attack by finding the smallest
set of meters which causes the system unobservable if they are removed. By protecting
these meters, attacker will not be able to attack the grid sneakily. However even if these
meters are known to us, it is still difficult to protect all of them due to the high cost and
management difficulties. Recall that the power grid is enormously big and complex, while
the number of meters being protected is limited [29]. Thus the detection methods are still
under investigation and more advanced methods being developed nowadays.
1.3.3 Proposed solutions
Since the static state estimators are widely used in power systems and play a very impor-
tant role in power grid operation, all the existing detection methods for malicious attacks
are based on the static state estimation, by using the following measurement model
z = Hx+ a + v
It leads to the difficulties in detecting unobservable attacks. As the power grid expands, static
state estimation becomes increasingly a limiting factor. Facing the increasing generations
and loads, the power grid becomes extremely large and complex. It is very challenging for
static state estimators to capture the power system dynamic behaviors, which also limits the
methods of detecting attacks.
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Recently there is a new trend in the research community in studying the dynamic state
estimation techniques, enabled by the SCADA system that is capable of measuring and
transmitting the power grid information with sampling frequency of 100 ∼ 200 Hz [54]. For
this reason the time varying nature and dynamic behaviors can be modeled quite accurately
[55]. By using dynamic state estimation, the power system state can also be estimated and
predicted more accurately, because the system state estimation is now related not only to
the present measurement but also based on the past system states. As a result dynamic state
estimation algorithms constitute a significant and integral part of the power system state
estimation techniques with a potential to impact the operation of power system control and
real time monitoring.
The dynamic state estimation comes with several advantages [56, 57]:
• It helps to identify and reject bad data so as to improve the estimator performance.
• In case of pseudo measurements, it readily provides high quality values and avoid ill
conditioning.
• It can also be used for data validation as the states are predicted one more time against
the measurement samples.
• In addition it can help identify abnormal changes in the system, the topological errors,
and other anomalies.
With these advantages, dynamic state estimation algorithms play more and more impor-
tant role in modern day system analysis [58, 59]. Today the SCADA systems have evolved
from early telemetry systems that used tone-based modulation techniques to transfer analog
and digital values at low data rates over telephone lines and radio links [3]. As the devel-
opment of sensor technology and the increasing processing ability of micro control unit; the
data accumulation ability of SCADA systems has been significantly improved with the faster
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data measurement rate which is up to 4 samples per cycle [54], i.e., 200 Hz sampling rate.
The modern SCADA systems are able to provide real time updates from thousands of re-
mote terminal units (RTUs) which are often spread over large geographical areas, using a
range of secure communications media, to multiple ‘users’ that may also be remotely located
[3]. Due to the accuracy and efficiency provided by the SCADA system today, the dynamic
state estimation becomes more and more feasible and practical in its application to power
grids. For this reason, the system dynamic state information and realization matrices are
identifiable. A new approach based on dynamic state information is proposed in this disser-
tation to detect the unobservable attack, and a new detection algorithm will be developed,
where the output residual error will significantly increase if an unobservable attack exists.
The effectiveness of this approach will be demonstrated in the next chapter.
However a more serious threat to the future smart grid is the replay attack in which
adversaries record a sequence of sensor measurements and replay the sequence afterwards
[9]. The well known replay attack is launched by Stuxnet malware. It is a computer worm
virus that was discovered in June 2010. It was allegedly designed to attack Siemens Step 7
software which is widely used for program logic controller (PLC) programming. It allegedly
attacked the Iran’s uranium enrichment plant at Natanz when the plant was undergoing
finishing touches in mid to late 2009. The Stuxnet allegedly caused 984 which is one fifth
of the centrifuges damaged. As Iran ran isolated valves to allow engineers to take away
failing centrifuges from its system without disrupting the enrichment process, Stuxnet shut
off some of these valves to increase pressure across the entire set of centrifuges so as to spun
them wildly out of control and damage them. Meanwhile, Stuxnet also secretly recorded the
normal operations status readings when the plant runs under normal condition, and then
played those readings back to the plant operators when the systems was failing. It is like
many Hollywood movies that bad guys play the pre-recorded security tape when they rob the
bank. Thus it would appear to the operator that everything was running smoothly while the
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centrifuges was already damaged. This replay attack prevents a safety system from taking
some actions to prevent abnormal operation.
The PLC is used in most of the industry infrastructures, especially in the power grid. The
Stuxnet story tells us that the power devices are very vulnerable to the replay attack. Recent
investigation and report by Symantec Corporation, a computer security software maker in
Silicon Valley, show that they snared the Stuxnet in a global malware collection system. It
is thus a fact that the Stuxnet worm already began to pop up around the globe. The worm
appeared not only in Iran, but also appeared in India, Indonesia and other countries. No one
knows whether their systems have been infected this worm and when it will start attacking
their systems. Thus it is a very urgent task to detect and prevent this new type of attacks
[60, 33].
In order to detect the replay attack, a simple method has been proposed in [9] for LQG
(linear quadratic Gauss) feedback control systems. The basic idea is to inject an additional
Gauss random noises to the control signal. Because of the use of the Kalman filter in the
LQG control system, the output estimation error is white and has the smallest error variance.
The injected random noise serves as a time stamp. Because it is generated by the designer
of the control system, it does not deteriorate the output estimation error. However when the
replay attack is present, then the injecting noises cannot be canceled, thereby increasing the
error variance for the output estimation. Several other papers follow with modifications on
the injected noise so to minimize the negative impact to the control system performance.
However no matter how to modify the injected noise, it is inevitable to deteriorate the control
system performance, and may also sacrifice the detection rate against the replay attack.
This problem will be investigated in this dissertation, and we propose two new approaches
without injecting Gauss noises at the control input. Instead the existing communication
noises induced by communication channels will be utilized to develop our new detection
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algorithms. The advantages of our new approaches lie in the fact that they can detect replay
attack without sacrificing the control system performance.
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2 A Dynamic Estimation Approach
The state estimator is a fundamental component of modern electric power systems. The state
of an electric power system operating in steady-state is defined as the vector of voltage mag-
nitudes and phase angles (voltage phasors) at all network buses. In this manner, knowledge
of the voltage phasor at each bus and the impedance of each branch (also known as network
topology) completely characterizes the state of the power system. The system data exchange
(SDX) service of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), introduced
in 2003, is capable of providing hourly topology information; while SCADA systems are ca-
pable of providing local power data in real-time [54].Therefore it is now feasible to estimate
the dynamic state of a power system.
Static-state estimators, introduced in [61], use power meter readings from SCADA systems
to generate an estimate of the state of the power system when operating in steady-state.
However, a power system rarely operates in steady-state since generation units and loads
are continually added and/or removed. This is especially true for modern systems where
renewable distributed generation sources contribute to unpredictable power fluctuations [62].
Under normal conditions a power system actually operates in a quasi-steady-state where the
state changes slowly. This means that it is possible to monitor a power system by taking
measurements over short intervals of time to estimate the state. Indeed, the smart grid
infrastructure facilitates the collection of these measurements. However, effective algorithms
to process this large amount of measurements are still being investigated. Some recent papers
that use graph theory as a tool for solving different aspects of the power flow problem are
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[63] which investigates the real-time identification of multiple external line outages; and [64]
which focuses on determining groups of transmission lines that if removed would cause a
severe blackout.
The objective of this chapter is to develop a distributed dynamic state estimator based
on the MAS framework (for an overview of MAS see [65]). By employing a distributed
estimator, power measurements obtained from the SCADA system can be used to obtain
state estimates of the power system when operating in quasi-steady state. More importantly
distributed state estimators can be employed to detect the unobservable attacks
2.1 Background Material
This section provides the background material to be used in later sections.
Network Graph and Its Associated Matrices
Consider a power system consisting of N buses denoted by the set of nodes or vertexes
V = {vi}Ni=1 and T transmission lines described by the set of edges E ⊂ V ×V. The network
topology of a power system is then specified by the weighted graph G = (V, E). An edge
starting at node i and ending at node j is denoted by (vi, vj) ∈ E . The node index set
is denoted by N = {1, · · · , N}. The neighborhood of node i is denoted by the set Ni =
{j | (vj, vi) ∈ E}. A path on the graph is an ordered set of distinct nodes {vi1 , · · · , viK} such
that (vij−1 , vij ) ∈ E . If there is a path in G from node vi to node vj , then vj is said to be
reachable from vi, denoted as vi → vj. The set of descendants of node vk is denoted as
Sk = {vj ∈ V : ∃ a path vk → vj}. The digraph is called connected if there exists a node vk
such that vj ∈ Sk for j = 1, . . . , N, j 6= k. Such a node vk is called a connected node.
Let A = [ aij ] ∈ RN×N be a weighted adjacency matrix. The value of aij ≥ 0 rep-
resents the coupling strength of edge (vj , vi). Denote the degree matrix for A by D =
diag {deg1, · · · , degN} with degi =
∑
j∈Ni
aij and the Laplacian matrix as L = D − A. Let
1N ∈ RN be a vector of 1’s. It is clear that L1N = 0 and thus it has at least one zero eigen-
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value. It is also known that Re{λi(L)} ≥ 0 ∀ i. In fact the only eigenvalues of the Laplacian
matrix on the imaginary axis are zero in light of the Gershgorin circle theorem. In addition,
zero is a simple eigenvalue of L, if and only if G is a connected digraph. We would like to call
attention to the fact that similar conditions on the eigenvalues of L can be obtained through
other properties of G. For example, in [66], it is stated that L has one zero eigenvalue if and
only if G has a spanning tree.
Positive and Bounded Real Lemmas
Consider an internally stable transfer matrix
H(z) = Ch(zI − Ah)−1Bh (2.1)
where Ah is a Schur stability matrix. Define its H∞ norm via
‖H‖∞ = sup
|z|>1
σ[H(z)].
The transfer matrix H(z) is said to be bounded real, if ‖H‖∞ < 1. The following lemma
provides necessary and sufficient conditions for H(z) to be bounded real [67].
Lemma 1. Consider the internally stable transfer matrix H(z) in (2.1). The following are
equivalent:
(a) ‖H‖∞ < 1, i.e., H(z) is bounded real;
(b) There exists a stabilizing solution Xh ≥ 0 to the algebraic Riccati equation (ARE)
Xh =A
′
hXhAh + A
′
hXhBh(I −B′hXhBh)−1B′hXhAh + C ′hCh (2.2)
satisfying I − B′hXhBh > 0;
(c) There exists a stabilizing solution Yh ≥ 0 to ARE
Yh =AhYhA
′
h + AhYhC
′
h(I − ChYhC ′h)−1ChYhA′h +BhB′h (2.3)
satisfying I − ChYhC ′h > 0.
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It is important to point out that the requirement on the stabilizing solution can be re-
moved. It is a fact [67] that if a solution Xi ≥ 0 to ARE (2.2) exists satisfying I−B′hXiBh > 0
or a solution Yi ≥ 0 to ARE (2.3) exists satisfying I − ChYiC ′h > 0, then its corresponding
stabilizing solution satisfying the corresponding inequality also exists.
Positive real transfer matrices are more complex than bounded real ones. They are square
transfer matrices; they allow simple poles on the unit circle with the rest inside the unit
circle; they cannot be strictly proper. However for convenience we will consider only stable
positive real transfer matrices. For this reason we begin with a square transfer matrix
S(z) = Ds + Cs(zI −As)−1Bs (2.4)
where As is a Schur stability matrix and Rs = Ds+D
′
s > 0. Such an S(z) is said to be strict
positive real, if
S(z) + S(z)∗ > 0 ∀ |z| ≥ 1.
The following result provides equivalent conditions for square S(z) to be positive real [68, 69].
Lemma 2. Consider the internally stable square transfer matrix S(z) in (2.4). The following
are equivalent:
(α) S(z) + S(z)∗ > 0 ∀ |z| ≥ 1., i.e., S(z) is strict positive real;
(β) There exists a stabilizing solution Xs ≥ 0 to ARE
Xs =A
′XsA+ (C
′
s − A′sXsBs)(Rs − B′sXsBs)−1(Cs − B′sXsAs) (2.5)
satisfying Rs −B′sXsBs > 0.
(γ) There exists a stabilizing solution Ys ≥ 0 to ARE
Ys =AsYsA
′
s + (Bs − AsYsC ′s)(Rs − CsYsC ′s)−1(B′s − CsYsA′s) (2.6)
satisfying Rs − CsYsC ′s > 0.
However asymptotic stability for S(z) is not required for S(z) to be PR. The next result
is quoted from [70].
27
Corollary 1. For S(z) in (2.4) with minimal realization and all eigenvalues of As being
simple and on the unit circle, the following statements are equivalent to S(z) being PR:
(i) There exists Xs > 0 such that
Xs − A′sXsAs = 0, C ′s −A′sXsBs = 0,
and Ds +D
′
s − B′sXsBs ≥ 0;
(ii) There exists Ys > 0 such that
Ys − AsYsA′s = 0, B′s − CsYsA′s = 0,
and Ds +D
′
s − CsYsC ′s ≥ 0.
If the inequality in (i) and (ii) are strict, then it is SPR.
2.2 Modeling and Estimation
Real Power Flow Model
For a power system operating in steady-state, with negligible admittance at every branch,
the real power injected at bus i [71] is expressed as
Pi = Vi
∑
j∈Ni
Vjbij sin(θi − θj). (2.7)
where bij is the admittance along line (i, j), Vi is the voltage magnitude of bus i, θi is the
voltage phase angle of bus i, and Ni is the set of neighboring buses connected to bus i. For
a power system with N +1 buses indexed from 0 to N (under the assumption that we know
the voltage level at each bus and that the phase angle of one bus is chosen as a reference),
the state of the power system will consist of a vector of N phase angles.
According to our previous discussion, modern power systems usually consist of generation
units and loads that are continually added and/or removed. Consequently, we assume that
the power system is actually operating in a quasi-steady-state, where the voltage phase angles
at each bus are changing slowly and randomly. Therefore, we propose to model the phase
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angle vector in the following form
θ(k) =
[
θ1(k) θ2(k) · · · θN(k)
]′
,
assuming that we have renumbered the buses to set bus 0 as the reference. To model the
dynamic behavior of the voltage phase angles, we propose to represent θi(k) for i = 1, · · · , N ,
as the output of an agent or dynamic system with the following discrete-time dynamics
xi(k + 1) = Aixi(k) +Bivi(k),
θi(k) = Cixi(k), (2.8)
where xi ∈ Rni, Ai ∈ Rni×ni, Bi ∈ Rni, and C ′i ∈ Rni , assuming strictly causal model. How
to obtain the matrices (Ai, Bi, Ci) is postponed to the next section. The sequence {vi(k)} is
a white noise process with E {vi(k)} = 0 and autocovariance sequence (ACS)
Rvi(k) := E {vi(t)vi(t− k)} = δK(k),
where E{·} represents the expectation operator, and δK(k) is the Kronecker delta function
defined by
δK(k) =
 1, k = 0,0, k 6= 0.
The model (2.8) assumes that θi(k) is a wide-sense-stationary (WSS) process which may
not be the case for voltage phase angles. However it provides a useful first approximation
for the dynamic state estimation problem. More sophisticated models may incorporate non-
stationary random processes that will be studied in the future. It is important to note that θi
is the output of the ith agent; and that in general each agent will have a different state-space
model and state vector dimension. In the MAS literature, systems of this type are called
heterogeneous MASs. If all agents have the same state-space models, then they are referred
to as homogeneous MASs. We expect that a heterogeneous MAS will provide a better model
than a homogeneous MAS for the dynamics of the phase angles.
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Another approximation we will make is to assume that the difference θi(k)−θj(k) is small
for all i, j ∈ N . This is usually termed a small-signal model or linear DC power flow model.
With this assumption, and under the quasi-steady-state approximation, (2.7) is converted
to
Pi(k) = Vi
∑
j∈Ni
Vjbij [θi(k)− θj(k)] .
We assume that all sensor devices can measure noise corrupted power measurements, but
only one sensor is able to measure its own phase. Therefore the measurement equation is
expressed as
yi(k) = diPi(k) + giθi(k) + ηi(k) (2.9)
with ηi(k) additive white Gauss noise (AWGN) of variance σ
2
ηi
and gi 6= 0 for only one i. By
rewriting (2.9) as
yi(k) = diVi
∑
j∈Ni
Vjbij [θi(k)− θj(k)] + giθi(k) + ηi(k)
it is clear that we can only measure the differences between the phase angle at a bus, except
for one bus where gi 6= 0. To simplify notation, let us define aij = ViVjbij so that the above
equation can be rewritten as
yi(k) = di
∑
j∈Ni
aij [θi(k)− θj(k)] + giθi(k) + ηi(k). (2.10)
It is clear that bij = bji, since it represents the admittance across the same branch, thereby
aij = aji for all (i, j). In the rest of this chapter, y(k) is denoted as a column vector consisting
of {yi(k)}Ni=1. That is, y(k) represents the collective measurements. Similarly, we denote
x(k) =

x1(k)
...
xN (k)
 , w(k) =

w1(k)
...
wN(k)
 ,
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as the collective state vectors and the collective noise processes with wi(k) =
[
vi(k) ηi(k)/σηi
]′
.
It is now straightforward to see that the collective measurement equations can be expressed
as
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bw(k), (2.11)
y(k) = (DL+G)Cx(k) + Ew(k), (2.12)
where L is the Laplacian matrix, and
A = diag (A1, . . . , AN) , B = diag
(
B˜1, . . . , B˜N
)
,
C = diag (C1, . . . , CN) , E = diag (E1, . . . , EN) ,
D = diag (d1, . . . , dN) , G = diag (g1, . . . , gN)
with B˜i =
[
Bi 0
]
and Ei =
[
0 σηi
]
. From (2.12), it is clear that the power network
topology induces a graph on the measurement equation.
Estimation
We propose the following modified version of the distributed estimator introduced in [72]
xˆi(k + 1) = Aixˆi(k)−Ki (yˆi(k)− yi(k))
θˆi(k) = Cixˆi(k), (2.13)
where {Ki} are state estimation gains. We will show later that this proposed estimator
requires gi 6= 0 for only one i. Physically, this means that we require that only one device be
able to measure its own phase angle, but the power measurements {Pi} are available for all
i.
To design the estimator gain, we shall study the error difference signal between the esti-
mated and actual agent state. Set ei(k) = xˆi(k)− xi(k) as the error signal and
e(k) =
[
e1(k) · · · eN(k)
]′
31
that is the collective error signal. Denote M = DL +G. After some algebra, we obtain the
collective error dynamics
e(k + 1) = (A−KMC) e(k)− (B −KDE)w(k) (2.14)
where D = diag (d1, . . . , dN), G = diag (g1, . . . , gN), and K = diag (K1, . . . , KN). Estimation
is aimed at designing the gain matrix K that stabilizes the error dynamics and minimizes the
estimation error variance. Because the Laplacian matrix is not diagonal, {ei(k)} are coupled
and thus minimization of the estimation error variance is difficult to achieve considering
that the grid size N can be prohibitively large. As an alternative we will seek to stabilize the
error dynamics and minimize the error dynamics locally and distributively. The following
two lemmas are useful.
Lemma 3. Let L be the Laplacian associated with G. There exist diagonal matrices D > 0
and G ≥ 0, with rank of G equal to 1, such that
(DL+G) + (DL+G)′ > 0 (2.15)
if and only if G is connected, and
rank

 L ei
−e′i 0

 = N + 1.
for at least one i ∈ N .
For a proof of this result, see the proof of Lemma 1 in [73]. The next result is established
for the multivariable systems, although its application to dynamic state estimation for smart
grid involves only single-input/single-output agents.
Lemma 4. Let Ti(z) = Ji+Ci (zI −Ai)−1Ki be a square transfer matrix with no eigenvalues
of Ai strictly outside the unit, those on the unit circle being simple, and Ji > 0 a positive
diagonal matrix. Then there exists an estimation gain Ki such that (Ai −KiCi) is a Schur
stability matrix and Ti(z) is strict positive real.
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Proof. Without loss of generality we assume that
Ai = diag(Ai1 , Ai2)
with Ai1 having all simple eigenvalues on the unit circle and Ai2 being a Schur stability
matrix. Partition Ci and Ki compatibly as
Ci =
[
Ci1 Ci2
]
, Ki =
 Ki1
Ki2
 .
Hence Ti(z) = Ti1(z) + Ti2(z) with
Tij (z) = Jij + Cij
(
zI −Aij
)−1
Kij
for j = 1, 2 and Ji = Ji1 + Ji2. We will show that Ji1 = Ji, Ji2 = 0, and Ki2 = 0 provide a
possible candidate, and we thus need only to design Ki1 to render Ti(z) SPR. Since Ai1 has
only simple eigenvalues on the unit circle, it has the form
Ai1 = diag
1,−1,
 cosϕ sinϕ
− sinϕ cosϕ
 , · · ·
 .
For this reason, Ti1(z) being SPR, if and only if
Ai1A
′
i1
= I, Ki1 = Ai1C
′
i1
,
and 2Ji1 −Ci1C ′i1 > 0 in light of Corollary 1. For Ti2(s) to be positive real, it is equivalent to
Tˆi2(z) := (2Ji2)
−1/2Ti2(z)(2Ji2)
−1/2
=
1
2
I + Cˆi2(zI −Ai2)−1Kˆi2
being positive real, where Kˆi2 = Ki2(2Ji2)
−1/2 and Cˆi2 = (2Ji2)
−1/2Ci2 . In accordance with
Lemma 2, Tˆi2(z) is positive real, if and only if the ARE
Zi = Ai2ZiA
′
i2 + (Kˆi2 −Ai2Zi2Cˆ ′i2)(I − Cˆi2Zi2Cˆ ′i2)−1(Kˆi2 − Ai2Zi2Cˆ ′i2)′
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has a solution Zi ≥ 0 satisfying I − Cˆi2ZiCˆ ′i2 > 0. Now setting Kˆi2 = 2Ai2Zi2Cˆ ′i2, the above
ARE is equivalent to a new ARE
Zi = Ai2ZiA
′
i2
+ Ai2ZiCˆ
′
i2
(I − Cˆi2ZiCˆ ′i2)−1Cˆi2ZiA′i2
having a solution Zi ≥ 0 satisfying I− Cˆi2ZiCˆ ′i2 > 0. In light of Lemma 1 and its subsequent
discussion, Gˆi(z) = Cˆi2(zI − Ai2)−1Bi2 has H∞ norm ‖Pˆi‖∞ < 1, if and only if
Yi = Ai2YiA
′
i2
+BiB
′
i + Ai2YiCˆ
′
i2
(I − Cˆi2YiCˆ ′i2)−1Cˆi2YiA′i2
has a solution Yi ≥ 0 satisfying I− Cˆi2YiCˆ ′i2 > 0. Because the above is equivalent to ARE for
Zi by taking Bi = 0, ‖Gˆi‖∞ < 1 always holds when Bi = 0. In fact Zi = 0 is the stabilizing
solution by the Schur stability of Ai2, leading to Kˆi2 = 0. This concludes the proof.
With these results in place, we now provide a method to construct the estimator gain K
in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. There exists a stabilizing estimation gain K to (2.14), if the underlying smart
grid topology, G, is connected.
Proof. Assume G is connected. Let M = DL + G with D and G as in (2.14). Since gi 6= 0
for only one i, G is a rank one diagonal matrix and by Lemma 4, M +M′ > 0. Note that
the error dynamics (2.14) are stable if
det(zI − A+KMC) 6= 0 ∀ |z| ≥ 1, (2.16)
i.e., A−KMC has no eigenvalues outside and on the unit circle. Since M+M′ > 0, there
exists J = diag(J1, . . . , JN) with Ji > 0 diagonal and invertible such that
M+M′ −M(J + J ′)M′ > 0. (2.17)
Note that (2.17) is a linear matrix inequality (LMI). So J can easily be computed with an
LMI solver. In addition the existence of such a J is clear: by taking J → 0, the above strict
34
inequality holds. Hence sufficiently small J satisfies the strict inequality (2.17). It is now
noted that (2.17) is equivalent to
(I −MJ)M′ +M(I − J ′M′) > 0.
Multiplying the above by (I − J ′M′)−1 from right and (I −MJ) from left yields
M′(I − J ′M′)−1 + (I −MJ)−1M > 0.
Since J can be taken sufficiently small, (I −MJ)−1 exists. Define
Π = (I −MJ)−1M ⇐⇒ M = Π(I + JΠ)−1
where “⇐⇒” stands for the equivalence relation. Then inequality (2.17) holds if and only if
Π + Π′ > 0.
Upon substitution of M = Π(I + JΠ)−1, the stability condition (2.16) is equivalent to
λ(z) := det(zI − A+KΠ(I + JΠ)−1C) 6= 0 ∀ |z| ≥ 1. (2.18)
Denote Ti(z) = Ji + Ci(zI −Ai)−1Ki and
T (z) = diag(T1(z), . . . , TN(z)) = J + C(zI − A)−1K.
In light of Lemma 3, Ki exists for each i such that Ti(z) is positive real. Combined with
Π + Π′ > 0, it implies that [73]
det[I +ΠT (z)] 6= 0 ∀ |z| ≥ 1. (2.19)
By the root locus argument, the above is equivalent to
det[T (z)−1 +Π] 6= 0 ∀ |z| ≥ 1.
Substitution of the realization of T (z) yields
det[T (z)−1 +Π] = det[J−1 +Π− J−1C(zI − A+KJ−1C)−1KJ−1].
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Hence the inequality (2.19) is in turn equivalent to
det[I + JΠ− C(zI − A+KJ−1C)−1KJ−1] 6= 0
∀|z| ≥ 1. That is, the inequality (2.19) holds if and only if
det[I − (I + JΠ)−1C(zI − A+KJ−1C)−1KJ−1] 6= 0
for all |z| ≥ 1. On the other hand the stability condition (2.18) is equivalent to
λ(z) = det[zI − A+KJ−1JΠ(I + JΠ)−1C]
= det[zI − A+KJ−1(I − (I + JΠ)−1)C]
= det[zI − A+KJ−1C −KJ−1(I + JΠ)−1)C]
6= 0 ∀ |z| ≥ 1.
Again by the root locus argument, the above is equivalent to
λ˜(z) := det[I −KJ−1(I + JΠ)−1C(zI − A+KJ−1C)−1]
= det[I − (I + JΠ)−1C(zI − A+KJ−1C)−1KJ−1]
6= 0 ∀ |z| ≥ 1
where we used the fact that det(I+AB) = det(I+BA). The above is identical to inequality
(2.19), and thus there indeed exist {Ki}Ni=1 such that (2.16) is true.
Under the stability assumption for (A−KMC), the steady-state estimation error covari-
ance Σ = E{e(k)e(k)′} for (2.14) satisfies the Lyapunov equation
Σ = (A−KMC)Σ(A−KMC)′ + (KDE − B)(KDE − B)′. (2.20)
In addition the steady-state estimation error covariance for θ can be obtained as
Σθ = CΣC
′ + Ση (2.21)
with Ση as the covariance of the measurement noise vector.
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Remark 1. It is important to note that our proposed estimator is distributed, in the sense
that each individual estimation gain Ki is designed based on the solution of an ARE of
order ni. This is certainly desirable since the collective state vector may be of a very large
dimension, making controller design computationally prohibitive. Also, due to Lemma 4, we
require only one gi to be nonzero. Recall that we require diagonal G ≥ 0 with rank of G equal
to 1. Loosely speaking, we require only one agent estimator to be placed on a connected bus
of the power system.
Determination of Phase Angle Dynamics
We now consider identification of the realization matrices (Ai, Bi, Ci) based on phase
angle measurement data. Recall that these matrices model the behavior of the bus voltage
phase angles when the power system is operating in a quasi-steady state. According to the
dynamical equation (2.8), θi(k) is a sequence of continuous random variables with a power
spectral density (PSD) Φθi(ω). The PSD is defined as the discrete time Fourier transform
(DTFT) of the ACS Rθi(k),
Φθi(ω) =
∞∑
k=−∞
Rθi(k)e
−jωk (2.22)
and admits the spectral factorization in form of
Φθi(ω) = Θi(e
jω)Θi(e
jω)∗ (2.23)
where Θi(z) is stable. If Φθi(ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ R, then Θi(z) also has all its zeros strictly
inside the unit circle. Computation of approximate Θi(z) based on {θ̂i(k)}, measurements
of {θi(k)}, has been well studied in the literature. We refer readers to the book [74]. It is
emphasized that many algorithms can be carried out to estimating an approximate PSD of
θi(k). A simple way is based on
Φ
(n)
θi
(ω) = E
{
1
n
(
n−1∑
k=0
θ̂i(k)e
−jωk
)(
n−1∑
τ=0
θ̂i(τ)e
−jωτ
)∗}
.
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In practice expectation can be replaced by average of the measured data over more than one
time horizon of interval length n. Since the above can be computed via the use of the fast
Fourier transform (FFT) algorithm, its numerical efficiency and reliability are well-known.
Various estimation algorithms from [75] can be used to identify Θi(z). Once Θi(z) is obtained
for i ∈ N , its realization matrices {Ai, Bi, Ci} can be easily determined.
A serious problem for identification of {Θi(z)} based on data {θ̂i(k)} is that these mea-
surements are not directly available. Indeed the measurement model in (2.10) implies that
P (k) = Lθ(k) where L is the Laplacian matrix associated with coupling coefficients {aij},
and
P (k) =

P1(k)
...
PN(k)
 , θ(k) =

θ1(k)
...
θN(k)

are collective bus powers and phase angles, respectively. Since the Laplacian matrix L has
a zero eigenvalue, power measurements cannot be used to estimate the phase angles at each
time instance. In fact even if we collect the noise-free measurements of {Pi(k)} over many
time samples and assume that the phase angles are time invariant over the given time interval,
the phase angles are still not uniquely determined. Hence an alternative has to be sought.
Recall our dynamic state estimation algorithm proposed in (2.13). The fact that measure-
ments of one of the phase angles are available, prompts us to use measurement equation
(2.9):
yi(k) = diPi(k) + giθi(k) + ηi(k)
over some time interval. In the measurement equation, di > 0 for each i but gi > 0 for
only one i ∈ N , and {ηi(k)} are measurement noises. That is, we need measurements of one
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phasor with the rest relative measurements. Denote collective measurements and noises as
y(k) =

y1(k)
...
yN(k)
 , η(k) =

η1(k)
...
ηN(k)
 ,
respectively. Then the measurement equations in (2.9) for 1 ≤ i ≤ N can be packed into the
following collective representation:
y(k) = (DL+G)θ(k) + η(k)
at each given time sample. Lemma 3 indicates that diagonal D > 0 and diagonal G ≥ 0 with
rank 1 exist such that
(DL+G) + (DL+G)′ > 0.
Hence M = (DL+G) is a full rank matrix, and
θ̂(k) = (DL+G)−1y(k)
is the maximum likelihood (ML) estimate of θ(k), provided that η(k) is a vector-valued
temporally white process with mean zero and covariance Ση, which holds in practice. Clearly
θ̂(k) is an unbiased estimate of θ(k) with error covariance given by
E
{
[θ(k)− θ̂(k)][θ(k)− θ̂(k)]′
}
=M−1ΣηM′−1.
Denote Σvθ = M−1ΣηM′−1. Then θ̂(k) = θ(k) + vθ(k) with vθ(k) a white process of mean
zero and covariance Σvθ .
It is important to note that the voltage phase angles may not be decoupled, i.e., the cross
product terms may not be negligible. This will affect the estimate of the PSD and in turn
negatively affect the model that generates the phase angles. However we believe that the
couplings among different phase angles are weak in normal operation of the power grid. In
the least we can assume that the phase angles are approximately decoupled over each time
interval. The cross coupling takes place only at some discrete time samples. For this reason,
our proposed distributed estimation algorithm has its merit.
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2.3 Secure Smart Grid
This section will develop a novel detection method for unobservable attacks widely known
for state estimation in power systems. We will demonstrate that our results on distributed
dynamic state estimation obtained in the previous section can be used to develop a new
detection algorithm that is especially effective for unobservable attacks.
2.3.1 A novel detection algorithm
Prior to presenting our new detection algorithm, a conventional anomaly detector, dis-
cussed in Chapter 1, will be presented first. Such a conventional approach can detect only
observable attacks.
Conventional Approach
Recall the power measurement model that can be written as
y(k) = (DL+G)Cx(k) + Ew(k) (2.24)
=Mθ(k) + Ew(k), (2.25)
θ(k) = Cx(k). (2.26)
When there is an attack vector a, the measurement equation becomes
ya(k) =Mθ(k) + Ew(k) + a, (2.27)
For an observable attack, it changes the measurement residual defined as
‖ya(k)− yˆa(k)‖ = ‖Mθ(k) + Ew(k) + a−Mθˆ‖
= ‖y(k)− yˆ(k) + a‖.
Hence the residual increases due to presence of the attack vector a, which is indeed the case
when the adversary has no knowledge of the topology of the grid. However when adversaries
have knowledge of the topology of the grid, they can find θa ∈ Rn, such that the attack
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a =Mθa, and it becomes unobservable, because such an attack vector a does not alter the
residual as shown next:
‖ya(k)− yˆa(k)‖ = ‖Mθ(k) + Ew(k) +Mθa(k)−M(θˆ(k) + θa(k))‖
= ‖y(k)− yˆ(k)‖.
That is, the attack a becomes a part of the parameter vector θ. As a result when the attack
is unobservable, it can bypass the residual test, which renders the conventional approach
unsuitable for detecting the unobservable attacks.
A New Approach
As explained earlier, conventional ways for detect the malicious attack are based on system
measurement data as well as statistical information of the measurement model. When attacks
or anomalies exist, and the measurements and the statistical model do not match each
other, then attacks or anomalies can be detected. But if the attack has knowledge of the
grid topology, i.e., the measurement model, then the attacker will be able to bypass the
residue test by constructing the attack vector in the range space of the measurement model.
So it becomes a part of the parameter vector and is thus termed as unobservable. Many
research papers are devoted to tackle such a difficult detection problem [29, 4, 31, 28, 76,
77]. Fortunately the dynamic state estimation as presented in the previous section can be
used to derive a new detector, and the consensus approach can be implemented to detect
unobservable attack.
According to the previous discussion on real power flow model and state estimation, the
discrete-time static measurement equations in (2.12) are the same as
y(k) =Mθ(k) + Ew(k), θ(k) = Cx(k), (2.28)
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bw(k), θ̂(k) =M−1y(k), (2.29)
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where θ̂(k) is the phasor angle vector calculated directly from the power measurement vector
y(k). The static estimate θ̂(k) has N components denoted as
θ̂(k) =

θ̂1(k)
...
θ̂N (k)
 .
For the dynamic state estimator in (2.13), estimation equations can be written as
yˆ(k) =Mθˆ(k), (2.30)
θˆ(k) = Cxˆ(k) =M−1yˆ(k), (2.31)
xˆ(k + 1) = Axˆ(k)−DK[yˆ(k)− y(k)]−GK[θˆ(k)− θ(k)] +KDEw(k), (2.32)
= (A−KMC)xˆ(k) +KMCx(k) +KDEw(k), (2.33)
Recall the output residual defined as
ey(k) := y(k)− yˆ(k). (2.34)
Since the output residual can not tell which bus is under attack, we modify the above
equation by multiplying it with M−1 from left. This results in the output angle residual as
eθ =M−1ey(k) = θ̂(k)− θˆ(k), (2.35)
Thus, by monitoring the angle residual, it is possible to determine which bus is under attack.
Under the normal operating condition, i.e., in absence of attack and fault of the power grid,
the residuals are very small due to
‖θ̂(k)− θˆ(k)‖ = ‖[θ(k)− θˆ(k)] +M−1η‖, (2.36)
E{[θ̂(k)− θˆ(k)][θ̂(k)− θˆ(k)]′} = CΣC ′ + Ση +M−1ΣηM′−1 (2.37)
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in light of (2.21). If there is an attack, the residual will significantly increased. Specifically
the state space model under attack can be described as
ya(k) =Mθ(k) + Ew(k) + a, (2.38)
x(k + 1) = Ax(k) +Bw(k), (2.39)
where a is the attack vector. For observable attacks, the residual is
‖θ̂(k)− θˆ(k)‖ = ‖[θ(k)− θˆ(k)] +M−1(η + a)‖, (2.40)
E{[θ̂(k)− θˆ(k)][θ̂(k)− θˆ(k)]′} = CΣC ′ + Ση +M−1(Ση + Σa)M′−1. (2.41)
In the case of unobservable attacks, adversaries can find θa ∈ Rn such that a =Mθa. Then
the residual is given by
‖θ̂(k)− θˆ(k)‖ = ‖[θ(k)− θˆ(k)] +M−1η + θa‖, (2.42)
E{[θ̂(k)− θˆ(k)][θ̂(k)− θˆ(k)]′} = CΣC ′ + Ση +M−1ΣηM′−1 + Σa. (2.43)
The above shows that no matter what the attack is (observable or unobservable), the resid-
ual always includes the attack component. Therefore the residual increases if the attack is
present. For this reason, our new approach is capable of detecting the attack by examining
the distribution of the output residual sequence, and compare the residual ‖θ̂(k) − θˆ(k)‖
with a threshold τ . An attack exists, if
‖θ̂(k)− θˆ(k)‖ > τ. (2.44)
2.3.2 Simulation studies
To illustrate our proposed detection approach, we carried out a simulation study for the
IEEE 14-bus test system. The configuration data of the test systems is obtained from the
data sheet of IEEE 14-bus [78]. To reduce the calculation complexity, all the generators are
removed. In this system, we set bus-1 as the slack bus with its power angle being always
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equal to 0o. Under the normal operation, a power system operates in a quasi-steady-state.
The bus loads are constant over short time intervals. The customer activities are modeled as
a wide-sense stationary (WSS) random process, denoted as v(k). As convention, we assume
that v(k) ∼ N (0, σ2v) is an independent process. Each bus is assumed to be described by the
following random walk Gauss-Markov equation
xi(k + 1) = xi(k) + vi(k) (2.45)
where the initial condition xi(0) = xi0 a Gauss random variable, independent of {vi(k)}
for all i. Hence xi(k) is also a normal process. The variance of the process noise is set as
σv = 0.01 in order to model slow variation of the phasor angle due to power consumers,
considering that the sampling rate for a typical SCADA system in a power grid is about 100
∼ 200 Hz [3, 54]. The following figure shows a typical power angle θi on bus-8 under the
normal condition. In this case, on bus-8 a typical power angle θi fluctuates around −20o:
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Figure 2.1: Typical power angle plot
For the measurement equation, the signal to noise ratio (SNR) is set to be 10dB. That
is, ση = σy/
√
10 with σ2y as the variance of the measurement signal. By convention, η(k) ∼
N (0, ση2) is an independent Gaussian noise process. In the simulation, a total of 2000 samples
is taken. Both the conventional approach and the consensus approach are used under both
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observable and unobservable attacks. The next figure shows the residual responses when the
attack is absent in the system.
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Figure 2.2: Angle residual (consensus approach, no attack)
The method used in estimation is the consensus approach, based on local and distributed
measurements, and random walk Markov Gauss dynamic state space models. It is seen that
the estimation error is quite small. We also simulated the conventional approach to estimating
the power phaser angles, without using dynamic state space models, and the replay attack
is absent. In fact the same data as from the previous figures is used. The error residual is
very close to that used in the consensus approach. These two results seem to admit similar
estimation performance.
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Figure 2.3: Angle residual (conventional approach, no attack)
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Next we consider malicious attacks in the form of observable attacks. We assume that the
attack vector a as a constant vector by simply setting its ith component ai = 1, and the
attack starts at the 500th time sample. The residual responses are shown in the next figure.
The sudden jump in the error response plot indicates the presence of the attack.
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Figure 2.4: Angle residual (consensus approach, observable attack)
We comment that the reason for the delectability lies in the fact that the dynamic state
space model is used and consensus estimation approach is adopted, and thus the estimated
angle cannot change abruptly as the actual angle change due to the attack. Hence the esti-
mation error increases right away. It needs to be pointed out that the conventional approach
can also detect the observable attack as illustrated by the angle residual plot next.
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Figure 2.5: Angle residual (conventional approach, observable attack)
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The more interesting case is when unobservable attacks exist. We suppose that there is
only one attack on the bus-8 starting at the 500th sample. The attack vector can be set
as a = Mθa with only θa8 = 1, resulting in an unobservable attack. Using the consensus
approach, the residual responses are shown in the next figure.
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Figure 2.6: Angle residual (consensus approach, unobservable attack)
Even though the attack on the bus-8 has a small amplitude, the residual shows clearly a
significant increase in the estimation error for the phasor angle of the bus-8. The underlying
reason for the detectability is the same as the case of observable attack. The next figure
shows the averaged error residual with the same window size.
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Figure 2.7: Averaged angle residual (consensus approach, unobservable attack)
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However when the conventional approach is taken, the situation is rather different as
illustrated next by the angle residual.
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Figure 2.8: Angle residual (conventional approach, unobservable attack)
It shows that under the unobservable attack, the residual obtained from conversional
approach has no significant change. The next figure shows the estimated angle for both the
conventional (red) and consensus (blue) approaches.
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Figure 2.9: Estimated angle (conventional and consensus approach, unobservable attack)
The above simulation studies demonstrated that our proposed consensus approach is capable
of detecting both the observable and unobservable attack, while the conventional approach
fails.
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We also provide our simulation study for the detection rate when the unobservable attacks
are present with different attack amplitudes. The following figure shows the detection rate
when the false alarm rate is kept at 5% using the consensus approach.
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Figure 2.10: Detection rate under different attack magnitudes
In the above figure, we set the window size equals to 5, and the attack magnitudes vary.
The vertical axis represents the detection rate while the horizontal axis giving the time
samples. The red dash line with ◦ shows the detection rate when the attack amplitude is
5% of the actual power angle; The blue dot line with ✷ shows the detection rate when the
attack amplitude is 4% of the actual power angle; The detection rate curves for 3%, 2%, 1%,
and 0.5% of the attack amplitude shown in black dot dash line with ×, pink solid line with
+, green solid line with ∆, and purple solid line, respectively.
The detection rate curves in Figure 2.10 are results of the average of 10,000 ensemble
experiments. To reduce the calculation time, we set the time sample size of each trial to 20.
The unobservable attack start at time sample 10. Hence, each curve start at time sample 9
and with false alarm rate equal to 5%. Note that the detection rate decreases as the attack
magnitude reduces, considering that as the attack amplitude decreases, it will be submerged
into the noise, and thus becomes undetectable.
49
The simulation study in Figure 2.10 is carried out with a window size fixed to be 5. In
practice we also want to detect the attack as quickly as possible after the attack is launched.
Thus the window size can not be too large. For this reason, we now fix the attack magnitude
to 2% and compare the detection rate of different window size when the false alarm rate is
still fixed at 5% with the attack starting at time sample 10.
Fig. 2.11 shows the detection rate curve under 5% false alarm rate when the window sizes
vary. In the above figure, the blue solid line with ◦) corresponds to the window size of 7, the
red dash line with ✷ to the window size of 6, the black dot dash line with × to the window
size of 5, the pink dot line with ⋄ to the window size of 4, the green solid line with ∆ to the
window size of 3, the purple solid line ⋆ to the window size of 2, and the blue solid line to
the window size of 1.
It is worth to noticing that reducing window size increases the sensitivity of the detector.
However it also reduces the steady-state detection rate. On the other hand increasing the
window size improves the steady-state detection rate, but the latency is also increased. So
there is a tradeoff between the window size and detection rate versus the sensitivity. The
choice of window size depends on the power system protection settings.
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Figure 2.11: Detection rates for different window sizes
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2.4 Conclusion
We have proposed a viable distributed dynamic state estimator based on the multi-agent
system (MAS) framework, assuming the availability of SCADA systems. A useful result from
[73] is employed to model the phasers as WSS processes, and to develop a viable dynamic
state estimator. We have assumed that the power system is described by a linear DC power
flow model and is operating in a quasi-steady state. Conditions on the existence of a a dis-
tributed estimator were derived and a solution was proposed to construct the distributed
estimation gains. Stability of the distributed state estimator was shown to hold. Although
we assumed that the phase angles are approximately decoupled, the results presented in
this chapter provides an initial attempt to tackle the dynamic estimation problem for the
power grid, and can be valuable to future research in this important research problem area.
More importantly with the dynamic state estimator and DC power flow model, we proposed
a consensus approach to detecting malicious attacks. While both the conventional and our
proposed approaches are effective for observable attacks, it is not the case for the unobserv-
able attacks. In fact the conventional approach fails utterly. On the other hand our proposed
approach is capable of detecting the unobservable attacks, verified by our simulation studies.
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3 Whitening Filter Approach
Recently replay attack has become a serious threat to the SCADA system. Adversaries record
a sequence of sensor measurements and replay the sequence afterwards while conducting
attacks on the system [2, 34, 79]. A well known replay attack is launched by the Stuxnet
malware. It is a computer worm virus that was discovered in June 2010 designed to attack
Siemens Step 7 software allegedly which is a widely used software for PLC programming. It
allegedly attacked the Iran’s uranium enrichment plant at Natanza in mid to late 2009 and
caused 984 which is one fifth of the centrifuges damaged. Stuxnet virus secretly recorded
the normal operations status readings when the system runs under normal condition, and
then played those readings back to the system operators when the systems failed. It is like
many Hollywood movies that bad guys play the pre-recorded security tape when they rob the
bank. Thus, it would appear to the operator that everything was running smoothly while
the system was already damaged. That prevents a safety system from doing some action
to prevent abnormal operation. As the PLC is used in most of the industry infrastructures,
especially in power grid, the replay attacks entice vulnerability of the power devices. Recently
investigation and report by a computer security software maker Symantec Corporation show
that they catched the Stuxnet in a global malware collection system. The Stuxnet has already
begun to spread around the globe. Not only in Iran, but also in India, Indonesia and other
countries have spotted this kind of worm . No one knows whether their systems have been
infected of such a worm, and when it starts attacking their systems. This is thus an urgent
call to all of us to develop methods to protect against replay attack [60, 33].
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This chapter will study the detection problem of the replay attack, and is endeavored to
contribute to this emerging research area. A whitening filter approach is proposed and shown
to be effective. We begin our chapter with the literature survey, followed by presentation of
the background material. Our proposed detection method based on whitening filters will be
detailed together with the computation aspect. The chapter will be concluded with simulation
studies.
3.1 Literature Survey
Mo and Sinopoli are the first [2] to consider the replay attack, one year before the Stuxnet
was reported in the news media. Their proposed method is quite simple. Its basic idea is
to inject a Gauss random noise in the control input, and test the estimation residue for
the output estimation error of the Kalman filter. They assume that the control system is a
discrete time linear time invariant (LTI) Gaussian with an infinite horizon Linear Quadratic
Gaussian (LQG) controller in which a Kalman filter is employed to estimate the system’s
state. A χ2 failure detector is used to detect the presence of the replay attack. Because the
added white noise is known to the controller, it is canceled in the Kalman filter if the replay
attack is absent. However when the replay attack is present, then the added white noise at
the control input cannot be canceled, resulting in higher output estimation error. For this
reason the added white Gauss noise serves a time stamp.
To be specific, the LTI system state dynamics are described by
xk+1 = Axk +Buk + wk,
yk = Cxk + vk,
with xk ∈ Rn is the state variable, uk is the control input, and yk ∈ Rm is the output
measurement at time k. The initial condition of the state vector x0 ∼ N (x¯0,Σ). The vector
signals wk ∈ Rn is the process noise with Gaussian distribution wk ∼ N (0, Q), and vk is the
measurement noise with Gaussian distribution vk ∼ N (0, R).
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The LQG controller consists of the Kalman filter and state feedback gain. Assumed that
the LQG system is in the steady-sate. Denote xˆk|i as the optimal estimate for xk conditioned
on all the measurements up to time index i. The Kalman filter computes the optimal state
estimate recursively according to
xˆk|k = (I −KC)xˆk|k−1 +Kyk, xˆk+1|k = Axˆk|k
K = PC ′(R + CPC ′)−1,
P = APA′ −APC ′(R + CPC ′)−1 +Q,
initialized with xˆ0|−1 = x¯0. By using the state estimate xˆk|k, the LQG control input has the
state feedback form, given by
uk = u
⋆
k = Lxˆk|k, L = −(U +B′SB)−1B′SA,
where S is the stabilizing solution to the following algebraic Riccati equation (ARE):
S = A′SA+W − A′SB(B′SB + U)−1B′SA.
For LQG control, the one-step prediction output error yk − Cxˆk|k−1 is white, which is an
important property of the Kalman filter. Its covariance is given by
E{(yk − Cxˆk|k−1)(yk − Cxˆk|k−1)′} = R + CPC ′ =: P.
Hence the normalized output error variance satisfies the following equation:
E{‖P−1/2(yk − Cxˆk|k−1)‖2} = E{(yk − Cxˆk|k−1)′P−1(yk − Cxˆk|k−1)} = m.
It is important to note that the normalized output error
(yk − Cxˆk|k−1)′P−1(yk − Cxˆk|k−1)
has a χ2 distribution, and χ2 detector is often employed to detect any anomalies of the
feedback control system. However it does not help for detection of the replay attack.
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Supposed that the attacker knows all sensor readings and can record and replay them.
Denote the modified reading as y˜k with y˜k = yk−T for some large integer T > 0. It is proven
in [2] that under the replay attack the residues y˜k − Cxˆk|k−1 will converges to the same
distribution as of yk − Cxˆk|k−1, i.e.,
E[(y˜k − Cxˆk|k−1)′P−1(y˜k − Cxˆk|k−1)] = E[(yk − Cxˆk|k−1)′P−1(yk − Cxˆk|k−1)] = m.
Thus the conventional χ2 detector is useless in detecting the replay attack.
To remedy the above problem, Mo and Sinopoli [2] propose to redesign the controller by
adding a Gauss white noise signal to the control input, leading to
uk = u
∗
k +∆uk, ∆uk ∼ N (0,L ),
where u∗k is the original optimal LQG control signal, and u
∗
k and ∆uk are independent of each
other. In this case the residues {y˜k − Cxˆk|k−1} do not converges to the same distribution as
yk − Cxˆk|k−1. To be specific, in absence of attack,
E[(yk − Cxˆk|k−1)′P−1(yk − Cxˆk|k−1)] = m,
Under the replay attack, there holds
E[(y˜k − Cxˆk|k−1)′P−1(y˜k − Cxˆk|k−1)] = m+ 2Tr(C ′P−1CU ),
where Tr(·) denotes trace, and U satisfies the following Lyapunov equation
U −BLB′ = A U A ′.
with A , (A+BL)(I −KC). As a result the replay attack is can be detected using the χ2
detector at each time index k in the following form
gk =
k∑
i=k−T +1
(yk − Cxˆk|k−1)′P−1(yk − Cxˆk|k−1) ≶ threshold
where T is the window size to estimate the expectation, which means that gk is χ
2 distributed
with T degrees of freedom.
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The threshold depends on the requirement of detection rate versus false alarm rate. In
addition the greater the covariance L of ∆u is, the higher the detection rate and also the
greater loss of system performance will be. As shown in [2] for a particular example, this
method achieves the detection rate achieves 35% with the covariance L = 0.6, but at the
same time the LQG performance is lost 91% with respect to the optimal LQG cost. There
thus exists a tradeoff between the detection rate and control performance.
To reduce the loss of performance, [1] applies a game theoretic method to detection of
the replay attack. Based on the method of Mo and Sinopoli, [1] also considers the LTI
plant using the Kalman filter, optimal LQG controller, and χ2 detector. The difference
lies in employment of a finite horizon, zero-sum, non-stationary stochastic game approach
to reduce the control and detection cost. The authors of [1] use switching between two
different controllers according to the system dynamics. One is the secure controller (capable
of detecting the replay attack but with suboptimal cost) designed by Mo and Sinopoli with
the control input signal uk = u
∗
k+∆uk. The other one is the optimal controller (incapable of
detecting detect replay attack) with no additional noise signal ∆uk being added to the control
input signal. An optimal control policy is developed based on the game theory framework by
switching between the two controllers shown in Fig. 3.1. The simulation results show thatthe
system performance loss is reduced half while detection rate is only reduced 5 percent.
Figure 3.1: Block Diagram of switching controller [1]
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To reduce the system performance loss, Tran and Shin [80] also designed a new detection
scheme based on the method provided by Mo and Sinopoli [2]. Instead of adding random
signal ∆uk to control input signal continuously through the whole control process, they
modified the way by adding the random signal ∆uk periodically only for small time duration
with the period T . So the system will operate normally in the remaining time. By adjusting
the period T of adding ∆uk, the detection rate can be guaranteed and the system performance
loss will also be reduced. The simulation results show that the system performance loss can
be reduced when there is no attack, while providing an adjustable detection rate for the
replay attack [80].
The method of Mo and Sinopoli provides a basic way of detecting the replay attack at
the expense of losing some control performance. The second and third methods are able to
reduce the system control performance loss by sacrificing the detection rate. Although these
methods are all effective, they can not eliminate the injection of the random noise to the
control signal. In addition the exiting detection methods are all based on the LQG controller.
The applicability to those non-LQG feedback control systems is questionable. In this chapter
and the next, we will propose two different new approaches without adding the Gauss white
noise to the control input by recognizing that the use of network and digital channels in
SCADA systems, the communication noises can be used to detect the replay attacks.
3.2 Main Results
This section presents our whitening filter approach to detection of the replay attack. The
first subsection will prepare the background material prior to presentation of our proposed
detection method. Computational issues will be studied in the third subsection.
3.2.1 Preliminaries
A SCADA system is also a networked control system (NCS) that has the feedback con-
troller situated in a different physical location from that of the plant, and it communicates
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with the plant via a (often wireless) network. The use of networks in feedback control systems
thus creates a vulnerability for malicious attacks which seek to destabilize and damage the
physical system. Specifically consider the discrete-time feedback control system in the block
diagram next where the time index k is integer-valued.
✲ ♠ ✲ P (z)
❄♠✛✛−K(z)
✻
d(k) u(k) y(k)
η(k)w(k)v(k)
Figure 3.2: Networked feedback control system
In Fig. 3.2, the steady-state responses of the input and output are removed in order to
understand better the real issue in secure feedback control. Let q−1 be the unit delay operator.
In accordance with the block diagram in Fig. 3.2, there holds v(k)
w(k)
 =
 v(k)
y(k)
+
 0
η(k)

=
 0 −K(q)
P (q) 0

 u(k)
w(k)
+
 0
η(k)

=
 0 −K(q)
P (q) 0

 v(k)
w(k)
+
 0
P (q)d(k) + η(k)

=
 I K(q)
−P (q) I

−1  0
P (q)d(k) + η(k)

=
 −K(q)
I
 [I + P (q)K(q)]−1 [ P (q) I ]
 d(k)
η(k)
 .
The above indicates that the closed-loop transfer matrix from the exogenous inputs {d(k)}
and {η(k)} to {w(k)} and {v(k)}, the input/output signals of the feedback controller −K(z),
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is given by
TK(z) =
 −K(z)
I
 [I + P (z)K(z)]−1 [ P (z) I ] . (3.1)
A similar derivation yields u(k)
y(k)
 =
 I
P (q)
 [I +K(q)P (q)]−1 [ I −K(q) ]
 d(k)
η(k)
 .
Thus the closed-loop transfer matrix from the exogenous inputs {d(k)} and {η(k)} to {u(k)}
and {y(k)}, the input/output signals of the plant model P (z), given by
TP (z) =
 I
P (z)
 [I +K(z)P (z)]−1 [ I −K(z) ] . (3.2)
Without loss of generality the plant model P (z) with m-input/p-output is assumed to
admit a stabilizable and detectable state-space realization. Its transfer matrix is given as
P (z) = D + C(zI − A)−1B :=
 A B
C D
 . (3.3)
As a result a stabilizing state feedback gain F and a stabilizing state estimation gain L exist
such that (A + BF ) and (A + LC) are both Schur stability matrix. It is well known that
P (z) admits left/right coprime factorizations (LCF/RCF)
P (z) = M˜(z)−1N˜(z) = N(z)M(z)−1 (3.4)
with {M˜(z), N˜(z),M(z), N(z)} all stable transfer matrices. Assume that the feedback sys-
tem in Fig. 1 is internally stable. Then the controller K(z) admits left and right coprime
factorizations
K(z) = V˜ (z)−1U˜(z) = U(z)V (z)−1 (3.5)
with {V˜ (z), U˜(z), V (z), U(z)} all stable transfer matrices satisfying the Bezout identity V˜ (z) U˜(z)
−N˜(z) M˜(z)

 M(z) −U(z)
N(z) V (z)
 = Im+p ∀ |z| ≥ 1. (3.6)
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It is emphasized that the LCF and RCF for the plant model and for the stabilizing con-
troller always exist and satisfy the Bezout identity in (3.6). The computation of such LCF
and RCF for the plant and controller can be simplified for the observer-based controller
Ko(z) = F (zI − A− BF − LC − LDF )−1L. (3.7)
Recall that (A+BF ) and (A+LC) are both stability matrix. In this case Ko(z) admits left
and right coprime factorizations
Ko(z) = V˜o(z)
−1U˜o(z) = Uo(z)Vo(z)
−1
with realizations of its coprime factors together with those of coprime factors of P (z) specified
as  V˜o(z) U˜o(z)
−N˜(z) M˜(z)
 =

A+ LC −(B + LD) L
F Im 0
Ω−1C −Ω−1D Ω−1
 , (3.8)
 M(z) −Uo(z)
N(z) Vo(z)
 =

A+BF B −LΩ
F Im 0
C +DF D Ω
 (3.9)
for any Ω that is nonsingular. The above is a slight modification from the existing literature.
Then any stabilizing controller K(z) for the feedback system in Fig. 1 has the form
K(z) =
(
V˜o + JN˜
)−1 (
U˜o − JM˜
)
= (Uo −MJ) (Vo +NJ)−1 (3.10)
for some stable J(z). It follows that the coprime factors of K(z) in (3.5) given by
V (z) = Vo(z) +N(z)J(z), U(z) = Uo(z)−M(z)J(z), (3.11)
V˜ (z) = V˜o(z) + J(z)N˜(z), U˜(z) = U˜o(z)− J(z)M˜(z), (3.12)
satisfy the Bezout identity (3.6). Conversely if the LCF/RCF of K(z) in the above are
available, then J(z) can be obtained as
J(z) = U˜0(z)V (z)− V˜0(z)U(z) = V˜ (z)U0(z)− U˜(z)V0(z). (3.13)
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Normally the exogenous inputs {d(k)} and {η(k)} are unknown disturbances and measure-
ment noises, respectively. They are often white wide-sense stationary (WSS) random pro-
cesses. However when attacks are present, {d(k)} and {η(k)} are replaced by {αu(k)+ d(k)}
and {αy(k) + η(k)}, respectively, as shown next.
✲ ♠ ✲ P (z) ✲ ♠✛
❄♠✛✛−K(z)✛♠✲
✻
d(k) u(k) y(k) η(k)
αy(k)w(k)v(k)αu(k)
Figure 3.3: Feedback control system under attack
It is assumed that the signals available for monitoring are at the controller site, and hence
{v(k), w(k)} can be logged by the controller, while the most valuable data {u(k), y(k)} from
the physical system are unavailable. In fact only {w(k)} need be collected for monitoring
the underlying feedback control system, in light of the fact that {v(k)} can be computed
based on {w(k)} and the controller model K(z). In order to conceal the attack and induce
damages, it is very likely that {αu(k)} are unbounded, but {αy(k)} are bounded. Even
if bounded αu(k) is used for malicious attack, it can be very irregular and disruptive in
order to cause hardware damage of the physical system. As a result {αu(k)} and {αy(k)},
injected by malicious attacks at the receiver end of the network, have different objectives:
the former is aimed at replacing u(k) so to damage the physical system while the latter is
aimed at concealing the true output y(k). For this reason early detection of the presence of
the malicious attacks based on {v(k), w(k)} becomes a very challenging problem facing the
NCS control community.
This chapter will be focused on the replay attack studied initially in [2]. The notorious
Stuxnet worm is an example of such an attack. It fits to the framework in Fig. 2 by taking
αy(k) = (q
−τα − 1)[y(k) + η(k)] =⇒ w(k) = y(k − τα) + η(k − τα) (3.14)
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for k ≥ kα, assuming that the replay attack takes place at time kα aimed at replaying the
output τα samples before. This way conceals the real-time output of the plant and is probably
the easiest way to fake the plant normal output. With τα >> 1, the catastrophic result of
y(k) under unbounded attack αu(k) is not observed at the controller site until a very long
time later.
Under the replay attack, αy(k) = −[y(k) + η(k)] + α0(k) with
α0(k) = y(k − τα) + η(k − τα) = P (q)u(k − τα) + η(k − τα)
= P (q)[v(k − τα) + d(k − τα)] + η(k − τα).
There thus holds w(k) = α0(k) in light of (3.14). The replay attack results in
w(k) = P (q)[v(k − τα) + d(k − τα)] + η(k − τα) (3.15)
for k ∈ [kα, kα + τα). The above contrasts to the case in absence of attacks:
w(k) = P (q)[v(k) + d(k)] + η(k). (3.16)
The replay attack is very effective so long as the feedback controller K(z) is stable, by
the fact that w(k) in absence of attacks is statistically no different from that in presence
of attacks. It is thus difficult to detect the presence of replay attacks. On the other hand
when the feedback controller K(z) is unstable, its output v(k) diverges under the replay
attack due to lack of real time information from the feedback measurements. Unfortunately
many feedback controllers in engineering practice are stable. Mo and Sinopoli in [2] (see also
[9])propose a smart strategy by injecting a random noise at the control input, which serves as
a time stamp. While being effective, the injected noise degrades the control performance. In
addition the results in [2] are restricted to LQG control systems. A true challenge for replay
attack lies in its detection without injecting noises, applicable to commonly used control
systems other than LQG, which will be studied in next subsections.
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3.2.2 Detection algorithm
Detection of replay attacks is a very challenging problem. Injection of a random noise is
effective to detect if a replay attack is present. However the noise injected at the plant input
has to be large enough in order to achieve good detection performance, which deteriorates
the control system performance. So there is a tradeoff between detection performance and
control performance. An interesting problem is whether or not the communication noises
present in the NCS can be used for detection of replay attacks without injecting noises. In
this chapter the underlying NCS is assumed to employ network communications between
the plant out and controller input over an additive white Gauss noise (AWGN) channel, and
thus η(k) present at the controller input has the form
η(k) = ηo(k) + ηc(k) (3.17)
with ηo(k) for the measurement error and ηc(k) for the communication error induced by the
AWGN channel. Both are i.i.d. random noises. It will be shown that the AWGN channel,
while introducing information distortion, can help detection of the replay attack without
injecting noise at the plant input, provided that the noise power due to the AWGN channel
is not too small. This section consider the whitening filter approach. The following result is
useful.
Lemma 5. Assume that the plant model P (z) in (3.3) admits a stabilizable and detectable
realization, and {d(k), η(k)} are both temporal white processes with covariance Qd and Qη,
respectively. Let Yn ≥ 0 be the stabilizing solution to the discrete-time algebraic Riccati
equation (DARE):
Yn = AYnA
′ − (AYnC ′ +BQdD′)Z−1n (AYnC ′ +BQdD′)′ +BQdB′ (3.18)
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where Zn = Qη +DQdD
′ + CYnC
′. Then with L = Ln := −(AYnC ′ + BQdD′)Z−1n , and the
left coprime factors {M˜(z), N˜(z)} of P (z) in (3.8) replaced respectively by
[
M˜n(z) N˜n(z)
]
=
 A+ LnC Ln (B + LnD)
Z
−1/2
n C Z
−1/2
n Z
−1/2
n D
 , (3.19)
P (z) = M˜n(z)
−1N˜n(z), and {M˜n(z), N˜n(z)} satisfy the normalization condition
N˜n(z)QdN˜n(z)
∗ + M˜n(z)QηM˜n(z)
∗ = I ∀ |z| = 1. (3.20)
Proof: It is noted that the DARE in (3.18) can be written into the form of the discrete-time
Lyapunov equation
Yn = (A + LnC)Yn(A+ LnC)
′ + LnQηL
′
n + (B + LnD)Qd(B + LnD)
′. (3.21)
With Zn = Qη +DQdD
′ + CYnC
′, it can be verified that
(A + LnC)YnC
′ + LnQηL
′
n + (B + LnD)QdD
′ = 0. (3.22)
Denote G˜(z) =
[
M˜n(z)Q
1/2
d N˜n(z)Q
1/2
η
]
. There holds
G˜(z)G˜(z)∗ = Z−1/2n (Qd +DQηD
′ + CYnC
′)Z−1/2n = I
for all |z| = 1 in light of (3.22) from which the normalized left coprime condition in (3.20)
follows. ✷
Lemma 5 indicates that
N (k) = N˜n(q)d(k) + M˜n(q)η(k) (3.23)
is a white process with mean zero and covariance identity. That is, the power spectral density
(PSD) of N (k) is identity at all frequencies.
Assume that the feedback controller K(z) is stabilizing. Then K(z) = Un(z)Vn(z)
−1 is an
RCF for some stable and proper Vn(z) and Un(z) by taking V (z) = Vn(z) and U(z) = Un(z)
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in (3.5). Note that K(z) may not be an observer-based controller. In fact it can be PID or
lead/lag compensator, provided that it stabilizes the feedback system in Fig. 1 or 2. Now
we can choose L = Ln so that N˜(z) = N˜n(z), and M˜(z) = M˜n(z). The fact that K(z) is
stabilizing implies that Vn(z) and Un(z) can be chosen such that
Vn(z) = Vo(z) +N(z)J(z), Un(z) = Uo(z)−M(z)J(z),
for some stable J(z) in light of (3.10) by simply setting V (z) = Vn(z) and U(z) = Un(z).
Recall that L = Ln is used at present. In addition there holds
M˜n(z)Vn(z) + N˜n(z)Un(z) = I ∀ |z| ≥ 1. (3.24)
The right coprime factorization of P (z) = N(z)M(z)−1 can be obtained by taking some
stabilizing state feedback gain F , and thus Vo(z), Uo(z), and V˜o(z), U˜o(z) are also available
using L = Ln and chosen stabilizing state feedback gain F .
Consider the first case of no attack. There holds
TK(z) =
 −Un(z)
Vn(z)
[ N˜n(z) M˜n(z) ] . (3.25)
Stability of K(z) implies that Vn(z)
−1 is also a stable and causal transfer matrix. It follows
that w(k) = Vn(q)N (k) by (3.1), (3.25), and by the definition ofN (k) in (3.23). Then Vn(z)−1
represents a whitening filter in the sense that the filtered signal
s(k) = Vn(q)
−1w(k) = N (k) (3.26)
is a white process with covariance identity, in light of the normalized left coprime factorization
in (3.20) for the plant model P (z) and the discussion after Lemma 5. Consequently the PSD
of s(k) is given by Φs(ω) = I for all ω.
Suppose that the replay attack takes place at k = kα for the duration of τα >> 1. In this
case under the hypothesis of (3.17), the noise η(k) corrupted at the controller input consists
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of two parts with ηo(k) from the output measurement error, and ηc(k) from the error induced
by the communication network. In absence of replay attacks, there is no need to separate
ηo(k) and ηc(k). However in presence of replay attacks, the communication error ηc(k) plays
a crucial role in detection of the replay attack. The PSD Φw(ω) for w(k) is given in the
following result.
Proposition 1. Suppose that ηo(k) and ηc(k) are assumed to be independent white processes
for all k. Let {M˜n(z), N˜n(z)} in (3.19) be LCF of P (z) satisfying (3.20), and {Vn(z), Un(z)}
be RCF of the stabilizing controller satisfying (3.24). Under the replay attack, the PSD of
w(k) is given by
Φw(ω) = Vn(e
jω)
[
I − M˜n(ejω)QηcM˜n(ejω)∗
]
Vn(e
jω)∗
+N(ejω)U˜(ejω)QηcU˜(e
jω)∗N(ejω)∗ +Qηc
where Qηc is the covariance of ηc(k).
Proof: Suppose that k > kα. Denote
Nα(k) = N (k − τα) = N˜n(q)d(k − τα) + M˜n(q)η(k − τα). (3.27)
Recall N (k) in (3.23). Over the time interval of [kα, kα + τα),
w(k) = wα(k) = y(k − τα) + ηo(k − τα) + ηc(k)
= w(k − τα)− ηc(k − τα) + ηc(k)
= Vn(q)Nα(k)− ηc(k − τα) + ηc(k)
= Vn(q)
[
N˜n(q)d(k − τα) + M˜n(q)ηo(k − τα)
]
−
[
I − Vn(q)M˜n(q)
]
ηc(k − τα) + ηc(k).
The Bezout identity in (3.6) can also be written as M(z) −Un(z)
N(z) Vn(z)

 V˜ (z) U˜(z)
−N˜n(z) M˜n(z)
 = Im+p ∀ |z| ≥ 1. (3.28)
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The above implies I − Vn(z)M˜n(z) = N(z)U˜ (z), leading to
wα(k) = Vn(q)
[
N˜n(q)d(k − τα) + M˜n(q)ηo(k − τα)
]
−N(q)U˜(q)ηc(k − τα) + ηc(k). (3.29)
The expression of wα(k) is different from w(k) prior to kα. As a result s(k) = Vn(q)
−1wα(k)
is not a white process in general. Since the four terms in (3.29) are all uncorrelated, the
PSD of w(k) over [kα, kα + τα) can be easily obtained as in the proposition in which the
normalization property (3.20) is used in obtaining the PSD expression. ✷
Proposition 1 can be used to derive the PSD for
s(k) = sα(k) = Vn(q)
−1wα(k) (3.30)
in presence of attacks. It can be easily seen that the PSD of s(k) is given by
Φs(ω) = I − M˜n(ejω)QηcM˜n(ejω)∗ (3.31)
+ Vn(e
jω)−1
[
N(ejω)U˜(ejω)QηcU˜(e
jω)∗N(ejω)∗ +Qηc
]
Vn(e
jω)∗−1.
Hence if ‖Φs(ω)− I‖ is significantly greater than zero in most of the frequency range, then
successful detection of presence of replay attacks will have high probability.
The above analysis shows that detection of replay attack is equivalent to detecting whether
or not s(k) is white, assuming that s(k) deviates from white noise significantly under replay
attacks. Although several schemes exist, we adopt the χ2 detector in this chapter.
3.2.3 Computational issues
This section is focused on the computation of the transfer matrix Vn(z) that whitens the
observed signal w(k) by the fact that s(k) = Vn(q)w(k) is white. The computation can be
complicated for a general stabilizing controller. Two different cases will be considered.
Observer-based controller
If we assume an observer-based controller, then
K(z) = F (zI − A− BF − LC)−1L (3.32)
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where L 6= Ln in general. In this case, denote
Ko(z) = F (zI − A−BF − LnC)−1Ln 6= K(z). (3.33)
The LCF, and RCF of Ko(z) have realizations specified as in (3.8), and (3.9), respectively
with L replaced by Ln. Then realization of Vn(z) can be obtained in closed form. The general
form for any stabilizing controller K(z) = Un(z)Vn(z)
−1 in (3.5) gives Un(z)
Vn(z)
 =
 Uo(z)
Vo(z)
+
 −M(z)
N(z)
 J(z). (3.34)
Multiplying
[
−V˜o(z) U˜o(z)
]
from left and using Ko(z) = Uo(z)Vo(z)
−1 = V˜o(z)
−1U˜o(z)
yield
J(z) =
[
V˜o(z) U˜o(z)
] −Un(z)
Vn(z)
 (3.35)
by the Bezout identity V˜o(z)M(z) + U˜o(z)N(z) = I. It follows that
J(z) =
 A+ LnC −(B + LnD) Ln
F I 0


A +BF −L
F 0
C +DF I
 =
 A+ LnC Ln − L
F 0
 .
(3.36)
Substituting the above back to (3.34) gives the realization of Vn(z) as
Vn(z) =
 Avn Bvn
Cvn Dvn
 :=

A+ LnC 0 Ln − L
BF A+BF −Ln
DF C +DF I
 . (3.37)
Since PSD Φs(ω) or Φw(ω) also requires knowledge of N(z) and U˜(z) that are given next:
N(z) =
 A+BF B
C +DF D
 , U˜(z) = U˜o(z)− J(z)M˜n(z),
U˜o(z) =
 A+ LnC Ln
F 0
 .
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More general types of controllers
In the case when the feedback controller is neither in observer form, nor in Kalman filter
form, then computation of Vn(z) becomes more complex. Since K(z) is stable for our replay
attack problem, we have that
R˜(z) = M˜n(z) + N˜n(z)K(z)
is both stable and admits stable inverse. Hence RCF K(z) = Un(z)Vn(z)
−1 can be obtained
as
Vn(z) = R˜(z)
−1, Un(z) = K(z)R˜(z)
−1,
satisfying the Bezout identity
M˜n(z)Vn(z) + N˜n(z)Un(z) = I ∀ |z| ≥ 1.
If K(z) admits realization (AK , BK , CK, DK), then
R˜(z) = M˜n(z) + N˜n(z)K(z) =
[
M˜n(z) N˜n(z)
] I
K(z)

=
 A+ LnC Ln (B + LnD)
Z
−1/2
n C Z
−1/2
n Z
−1/2
n D


AK BK
0 I
CK DK

=

AK 0 BK
(B + LnD)CK A + LnC Ln + (B + LnD)DK
Ω−1DCK Ω
−1C Ω−1(I +DDK)

where Ω = Z
1/2
n . Hence Vn(z) = R(z)
−1 can be obtained as
Vn(z) =

AK − BK(I +DDK)−1DCK −BK(I +DDK)−1C BK(I +DDK)−1Ω
(B + LnD)CK − ΠDCK A+ LnC − ΠC ΠΩ
−(I +DDK)−1DCK −(I +DDK)−1C (I +DDK)−1Ω

(3.38)
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with Π = [Ln + (B + LnD)DK ](I +DDK)
−1. The above Vn(z) has much more complicated
expression compared to the previous type of stabilizing controllers.
The computation of U˜(z) is more involved. Let P (z) = N(z)M(z)−1 be RCF with realiza-
tion in (3.9) where F is a stabilizing state feedback gain. Then the stabilizing assumption
for K(z) implies that
R(z) =M(z) +K(z)N(z)
has a stable and proper inverse. In this case the LCF K(z) = V˜ (z)−1U˜(z) can be obtained
as
V˜ (z) = R(z)−1, U˜(z) = R(z)−1K(z),
satisfying the Bezout identity
V˜ (z)M(z) + U˜N(z) = I ∀ |z| ≥ 1.
Again let (AK , BK , CK , DK) be realization of K(z). Direct calculation gives
R(z) =M(z) +K(z)N(z) =
[
I K(z)
] M(z)
N(z)

=
 AK 0 BK
Ck I DK


A+ BF B
F I
C +DF 0

=

A+BF 0 B
BK(C +DF ) AK BKD
F +DK(C +DF ) CK I +DKD
 .
Denote Π˜ = (I +DKD)
−1[F +DK(C +DK)]. The inverse of R(z) is obtained as
V˜ (z) = R(z)−1 =

A +BF −BΠ˜ −B(I +DKD)−1CK B(I +DKD)−1
BK(C +DF )−BKDΠ˜ AK − BKD(I +DKD)−1CK BKD(I +DKD)−1
−Π˜ −(I +DKD)−1CK (I +DKD)−1
 .
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Assume that p = m. If p 6= m, then additional rows or columns can be appended to K(z)
and N(z), respectively, to satisfy p = m. After U˜(z) is obtained, these appended rows and
columns can be annihilated by taking limit to zero. The square assumption implies that
U˜(z) = R(z)−1K(z) = [M(z) +N(z)K(z)]−1K(z) = [K(z)−1M(z) +N(z)]−1.
For the same reason, DK can be assumed to be nonsingular. Otherwise small perturbation
can be introduced to DK to satisfy the non-singularity condition. The limit to zero can then
be taken for the perturbation. Hence
K(z)−1M(z) +N(z) =
[
K(z)−1 I
] M(z)
N(z)

=
 AK −BKD−1K CK BKD−1K 0
−D−1K CK D−1K I


A+BF B
F I
C +DF 0

=

A+BF 0 B
BKD
−1
K F AK − BKD−1K CK BKD−1K
C +DF +D−1K F −D−1K CK D +D−1K
 .
Let {A˜U , B˜U , C˜U , D˜U} be realization of U˜(z) = [K(z)−1M(z)+N(z)]−1. The above realization
gives
D˜U = (D +D
−1
K )
−1 = DK(I +DDK)
−1,
C˜U =
[
C˜U1 C˜U2
]
:= −D˜U
[
C +DF +D−1K F −D−1K CK
]
= −(I +DKD)−1
[
DKC + (I +DKD)F −CK
]
=
[
−F − (I +DKD)−1DKC (I +DKD)−1CK
]
,
B˜U =
 B˜U1
B˜U2
 :=
 B
BKD
−1
K
 D˜U =
 BDK(I +DDK)−1
BK(I +DDK)
−1
 .
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For A˜U , partition it into 2 × 2 sub-blocks compatible with the above, denoted by {A˜Uij}.
Then
A˜U11 = A +BF −BD˜U(C +DF +D−1K F )
= A +BF −B[F + (I +DKD)−1DKC]
= A−B(I +DKD)−1DKC,
A˜U12 = BD˜UD
−1
K CK = B(I +DKD)
−1CK ,
A˜U21 = BKD
−1
K F −BKD−1K D˜U(C +DF +D−1K F )
= BKD
−1
K F −BKD−1K [F + (I +DKD)−1DKC]
= −BK(I +DDK)−1C,
A˜U22 = AK − BKD−1K CK +BKD−1K D˜UD−1K CK
= AK − BKD−1K CK +BKD−1K (I +DKD)−1CK
= AK − BKD−1K [I − (I +DKD)−1]CK
= AK − BKD(I +DKD)−1CK .
The above derivation yields the realization of U˜(z) as
U˜(z) =

A−B(I +DKD)−1DKC B(I +DKD)−1CK BDK(I +DDK)−1
−BK(I +DDK)−1C AK − BKD(I +DKD)−1CK BK(I +DDK)−1
−F − (I +DKD)−1DKC (I +DKD)−1CK DK(I +DDK)−1
 .
(3.39)
For completion we will also provide the expression for realization of
Un(z) = K(z)[M˜n(z) + N˜n(z)K(z)]
−1 = [M˜n(z)K(z)
−1 + N˜n(z)]
−1.
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With {AK , BK , CK , DK} as realization of K(z), there hold
M˜n(z)K(z)
−1 + N˜n(z) =
[
M˜n(z) N˜n(z)
] K(z)−1
I

=
 A+ LnC Ln (B + LnD)
Z
−1/2
n C Z
−1/2
n Z
−1/2
n D


AK − BKD−1K CK BKD−1K
−D−1K CK D−1K
0 I

= Z−1/2n

AK − BKD−1K CK 0 BKD−1K
−LnD−1K CK A+ LnC B + Ln(D +D−1K )
−D−1K CK C D +D−1K

It follows that Un(z) = [M˜n(z)K(z)
−1 + N˜n(z)]
−1 can be computed based on the above
expression. For simplicity purpose, define
Un(z) = Z
1/2
n
[
DU + CU(zI − AU)−1BU
]
.
Then {AU , BU , CU , DU} does not involve Z1/2n . Direct calculation yields
DU = (D +D
−1
K )
−1 = DK(I +DDK)
−1,
CU = −DU
[
−D−1K CK C
]
=
[
(I +DDK)
−1CK −DK(I +DDK)−1C
]
,
BU =
 BKD−1K
B + Ln(D +D
−1
K )
DU =
 BK(I +DDK)−1
Ln +BDK(I +DDK)
−1
 .
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Again partition AU into 2× 2 blocks, denoted as {AUij} with compatible partitions. Then
AU11 = AK − BKD−1K CK +BKD−1K DUD−1K C
= AK − BKD−1K CK +BK(I +DDK)−1D−1K CK
= AK − BK [I − (I +DDK)−1]D−1K CK
= AK − BK(I +DDK)−1DCK,
AU12 = −BKD−1K DUC = −BK(I +DDK)−1C,
AU21 = −LnD−1K CK + [B + Ln(D +D−1K )]DUD−1K CK
= BDUD
−1
K CK = B(I +DKD)
−1CK ,
AU22 = A+ LnC − [B + Ln(D +D−1K )]DUC
= A− BDUC = A− BDK(I +DDK)−1C.
The above provides realization for Un(z) given by
Un(z) =

AK − BK(I +DDK)−1DCK −BK(I +DDK)−1C BK(I +DDK)−1
B(I +DKD)
−1CK A− BDK(I +DDK)−1C Ln +BDK(I +DDK)−1
Z
1/2
n (I +DKD)
−1CK −Z1/2n DK(I +DDK)−1C Z1/2n DK(I +DDK)−1

3.3 Simulation Results and Concluding Remarks
In the first example, we consider a typical plant model given by
P (z) =
0.03(z + 1)2
(z − 1)(z2 − 0.03z + 0.8) .
with variance Qd = 0.01, Qηo = 0.01 and Qηc = 0.01. Often industrial control systems use
lead/lag compensators to correct the bad behaviors. In this example, we assume that the
feedback controller has a lead/lag form given by
K(z) =
2(z − 0.931)(z − 0.89)
(z − 0.985)(z − 0.81) .
In terms of the step response, the closed-loop system admits 12% for overshot, 13Ts for rise
time, and 75Ts for settling time where Ts is the sampling period. In our simulation study,
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we assume that the system is in the steady-state prior to the replay attack, and we assume
that the replay attack is launched at time k = 250Ts.
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Figure 3.4: feedback signal w(k) under replay attack
The above figure shows the received signal w(k) at the controller site prior and after the
replay attack. Although this is one simulation result, but it is very typical. Usually we do
not see the difference from w(k) between absence of the replay attack and presence of the
replay attack. Indeed the signal w(k) has no significant difference after 250Ts than before
250Ts.
We also applied the whitening filter Vn(q)
−1 to the feedback signal w(k) to obtain the
filtered signal s(k) = Vn(q)
−1w(k).
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Figure 3.5: Filtered signal s(k) under replay attack
The above figure shows that the filtered signal s(k) shows some changes after 250Ts,
although the changes are not as significant as we want. In fact the simulation results are
random. Sometimes the changes are more obvious than others. We used χ2 detector to
analysis s(k) by setting up the window size to be 5 and the false alarm rate at 5%. The
detection rate for this example is shown next.
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Figure 3.6: detection rate for replay attack
The detection rate is obtained by taking the average of 10000 experimental ensembles.
The replay attack starts at time k = 250Ts. The above figure shows that the detection rate
curve begins at below 5% at time k = 250Ts. The detection rate grows as time increases.
It can reach more than 50% detection rate after a latency of about 200Ts. Although 50%
detection rate is better than the one in [2], the latency can be a problem.
A second example considers the plant model given by
P (z) =
0.004837(z + 0.9673)
(z2 − 1.905z + 0.905) .
with the same variance Qd, Qηo and Qηc are used. The feedback controller is a lead compen-
sator given by
K(z) =
56.63(z − 0.8533)
(z + 0.03108)
.
In terms of step response, the closed-loop system admits 13% for overshot, 3Ts for rise time,
and 18Ts for settling time. We assume that the system is already in the steady state prior to
the replay attack, and the replay attack is lunched at time k = 50Ts. The signal w(k) and
its filtered version s(k) are shown in the next two figures separately.
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Figure 3.7: Signal w(k) prior and post replay attack
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Figure 3.8: Filtered signal s(k) prior and post replay attack
It shows that under the replay attack the filtered signal s(k) contains more information
on the replay attack than the signal w(k). However both are less informative than those in
the previous example, respectively. The corresponding detection rate is shown below.
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Figure 3.9: detection rate for replay attack
The detection rate is obtained by taking the average of 10000 experiments under the 5%
false alarm rate. The replay attack starts at time k = 50Ts. Fig. 3.9 shows the line start at
5% at time k = 50Ts. The detection rate grows as time increases and it can reach to about
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25% detection rate with a shorter latency compared to the previous example. However the
detection rate is much smaller.
The two numerical examples demonstrate that the whitening filter approach is effective
to detect the replay attack. However the detection performance is not very stable and varies
as the underlying plant models and feedback controllers change. The problem lies in the
χ2 detector that computes the variance of the signal. Recall that the variance is the same
as integral of the spectral density over all the frequencies. Because the signal w(k) or s(k)
exhibits different behaviors at different frequencies, χ2 detector may not be the right detector.
For instance w(k) or s(k) can behave vary differently in some particular frequencies when
the replay attack exists compared to the case when the replay attack is absent. Hence a
spectral estimator at some special frequencies can serve a better detector. This problem will
be studied in the next chapter.
To recap, we introduced the replay attack model and existing detection methods in this
chapter. Since the existing detection methods are based on LQG controller and requires to
inject noise to the system control signal, the existing χ2 detector may not effective to detect
the replay attack. For this reason, we proposed a whitening filter approach without injecting
noises to the feedback control system thereby preserving the control performance. Our results
show that by employing a whitening filter to the feedback signal between the plant output
and controller input, the filtered signal will not be the white noise process anymore after
a replay attack is launched. Our simulation examples demonstrate the effectiveness of this
whitening filter approach. However latency exists and the detection rate may not be as good
as what we desire especially when the false alarm rate is kept to a small number such as
5%. Hence further work and new approaches are needed, which will be studied in the next
chapter.
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4 Spectrum Estimation Approach
The previous approach fails if ‖Φs(ω)− I‖ is small over majority of the frequency samples
when a replay attack takes place. In this case Φs(ω) is not far away from being white, and
thus detection of whiteness may result in high probability of errors. On the other hand, it
is possible that the PSD of s(t) is far away from unity at some specific frequency samples.
This fact motivates us to examine the spectral content of the signal s(t) or w(t) defined in
the previous chapter, and consider a spectrum estimation method to tackle the detection
problem for the replay attack. Our work in this chapter shows that the spectrum estimation
method provides a viable alternative to detection of the replay attack.
An important assumption for the spectrum estimation method is that Φs(ω) is far away
from the identity at some frequency samples although it is close to being white over majority
of the frequency samples. Hence detection of replay attacks can be accomplished by spectrum
estimation for Φs(ω) at those frequency samples it is far away from the identity after the
replay attack takes place. A threshold can be set up for the resulting spectrum estimates
based on the a priori information to determine the existence of the replay attack. However
this spectrum estimation method can be very sensitive to the variation of the variances of the
input disturbance, and output noises, including both the measurement and communication
noises. The reason lies in the fact that the left coprime factorization such as the one in (3.20)
makes use of the a priori knowledge of these variances. The mismatch between these true
variances and those used in computing the coprime factorization in (3.20), respectively may
lead to failure of the detection for replay attacks. For this reason we focus on a different
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way to compute the left coprime factorization in this chapter, which avoids the use of both
disturbance and noise variances in our detection algorithm.
4.1 Spectrum Estimation Approach
The spectrum estimation approach is motivated by the fact that a typical feedback control
system has all singular values of P (ejω) or K(ejω) tending to large in the vicinity of some
frequency ω = ωh. An asymptotic case is when the gain approaches infinity at ω = ωh. In
practice the gain greater than 30 ∼ 40 dB can be regarded as adequately large.
Let us consider the first case when all singular values of P (ejω) approach infinity at ω = ωh.
A different left coprime factorization of P (z) from that in (3.20) is used in this section. We
again assume white disturbance, white measurement noise, and white communication noises.
It is known that left coprime factors of P (z) can be obtained by taking a stabilizing state
estimation gain. In this chapter the stabilizing state estimation gain for the chosen left
coprime factors of P (z), denoted by P (z) = M˜0(z)
−1N˜0(z), are computed according to
L = L0 := −(AY0C ′ +BD′)(I +DD′ + CY0C ′)−1 (4.1)
where Y0 ≥ 0 is the stabilizing solution to DARE
Y0 = AY0A
′ − (AY0C ′ +BD′)(I +DD′ + CY0C ′)−1(CY0A′ +DB′) +BB′. (4.2)
That is, realization of the left coprime factors are given by
[
M˜0(z) N˜0(z)
]
=
 A+ L0C L0 (B + L0D)
Z
−1/2
0 C Z
−1/2
0 Z
−1/2
0 D
 , (4.3)
with Z0 = I +DD
′ + CY0C
′. This is also called normalized left coprime factors satisfying
N˜0(z)N˜0(z)
∗ + M˜0(z)M˜0(z)
∗ = I ∀ |z| = 1. (4.4)
Note the difference between the above equality and (3.20), especially the missing of the co-
variances Qd, Qηc and Qηo . For this reason, the spectrum estimation approach is more robust
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than the white noise approach studied in the previous chapter. Let K(z) = U(z)V (z)−1 be
a given stabilizing controller. Then in light of the parameterization of stabilizing controllers,
V (z) = Vo(z) +N(z)J(z), U(z) = Uo(z)−M(z)J(z)
for some stable and proper J(z). It follows from P (z) = M˜0(z)
−1N˜0(z) that TK(z) in (3.25)
becomes
TK(z) =
 −U(z)
V (z)
[ N˜0(z) M˜0(z) ] . (4.5)
The next result provides the PSD of w(k) at high-gain frequency ωh with high-gain ap-
proaching infinity asymptotically.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the input noise d(t) is a white process with covariance Qd = σ
2
dI,
and the AWGN noise have covariance Qηc = σ
2
ηcI. Assume that P (e
jω) has infinity gain at
ω = ωh. Let Φw(ω) be the PSD for w(t). In absence of replay attacks,
Φw(ωh) = σ
2
dV (e
jωh)V (ejωh)∗. (4.6)
In presence of replay attacks,
Φw(ωh) = σ
2
dV (e
jωh)V (ejωh)∗ + 2σ2ηcI. (4.7)
Proof: Under the assumption that all singular values of P (ejω) tend to infinity as ω → ωh,
M˜0(e
jω)M˜0(e
jω)∗ → 0, N˜0(ejω)N˜0(ejω)∗ → I, (4.8)
as ω → ωh in light of (4.4). It follows that w(k) now has an expression
w(k) = V (q)
[
N˜0(q)d(k) + M˜0(q)η(k)
]
(4.9)
in absence of attacks. There thus holds V (ejω)M˜0(e
jω)→ 0 as ω → ωh. We can now conclude
that the PSD of w(k) at ω = ωh is given by
Φw(ωh) = V (e
jωh)N˜0(e
jωh)QdN˜0(e
jωh)∗V (ejωh)∗ = σ2dV (e
jωh)V (ejωh)∗ (4.10)
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if Qd = σ
2
dI that verifies (4.6). In addition the identity (3.28) holds for the case when M˜n(e
jω)
and N˜n(e
jω) are replaced by M˜0(e
jω) and N˜0(e
jω), respectively, and Vn(z), Un(z), are replaced
by V (z) and U(z), respectively. As a result,
I − V (z)M˜0(z) = N(z)U˜ (z) ∀ |z| ≥ 1 =⇒ N(ejωh)U˜(ejωh) = I.
If the replay attack is present, then Φw(ωh) changes its value. Specifically (3.29) is modified
into
wα(k) = V (q)
[
N˜0(q)d(k − τα) + M˜0(q)ηo(k − τα)
]
−N(q)U˜(q)ηc(k − τα) + ηc(k). (4.11)
The results in (4.8) and (4.10) then lead to
Φw(ωh) = σ
2
dV (e
jωh)V (ejωh)∗ + 2Qηc
that verifies the expression of Φw(ωh) in (4.7), if in addition Qηc = σ
2
ηcI. ✷
Corollary 2. Under the same hypotheses of Theorem 2 and let s(k) = V (q)−1w(k), then
the PSD of s(k) at ω = ωh is given by
Φs(ωh) = σ
2
dI. (4.12)
in absence of attacks. In presence of replay attacks, there holds
Φsα(ωh) = σ
2
d + 2σ
2
ηcV (e
jωh)−1V (ejωh)∗−1. (4.13)
Since the proof follows from Theorem 2, it is omitted. It is important to observe that
entries of V (ejωh) do not have large value. Indeed
N˜0(z)U(z) + M˜0(z)V (z) = I =⇒ N˜0(ejωh)U(ejωh) = I
by the argument earlier. Since N˜0(e
jωh)N˜0(e
jωh)∗ = I by (4.8), U(ejωh) is a unitary matrix
as well, if the plant has an equal number of inputs and outputs. The above implies that
singular values of the controller K(ejωh) are the same as those of V (ejωh)−1 by
σi[K(e
jωh)] = σi[V (e
jωh)−1] ∀ i.
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Therefore Φsα(ωh) differs from Φs(ωh) significantly provided that K(e
jω) has high gain or
equivalently V (ejω) has small gain at ω = ωh.
Remark 2. If the control systems are designed based on the classic Bode method or based
on H∞ loop-shaping, then K(ejω) = U(ejω)V (ejω)−1 cannot have small gain over those
frequencies at which the plant P (ejω) has high gains. For instance many practical control
systems are required to have infinity gain at ωh = 0 in order to have zero steady-state error
for tracking step inputs, and a lag compensator is often employed as part of the feedback
controller. It follows that K(ejωh) has large gain. In the case when ωh 6= 0, a notch filter is
often employed as part of the feedback controller to boost the gain at frequency ωh. Since
U(ejωh) is unitary, V (ejωh)V (ejωh)∗ has very small gain. This shows that Φw(ωh) and Φs(ωh)
under replay attacks can be significantly different from those in absence of replay attacks. ✷
A dual case is when K(ejωh) has large gain or asymptotically approaches infinity. A similar
derivation can be carried out to conclude the same results in Theorem 2 and Corollary 2,
provided that P (ejωh) has a relatively large gain. The detail is omitted.
4.2 Detection Algorithms
This section is focused on detection algorithms for replay attacks using the spectrum
estimation approach. For this reason, several popular spectrum estimation algorithms [81]
will be reviewed first prior to developing the detection algorithm for replay attacks.
4.2.1 Spectrum estimation methods
Nonparametric estimation
For a given signal samples {s(k)}N−1k=0 , the simplest method to estimate its PSD at frequency
ωh is to set
Φˆs(ωh) =
1
N
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
k=1
s(k)e−jωhk
∣∣∣∣∣
2
.
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Let Rˆs(τ) be the estimated autocorrelation sequence (ACS) defined by
Rˆs(τ) =
1
N
N∑
k=τ+1
s(k)s(k − τ)′, 0 ≤ τ < N. (4.14)
The above estimate is biased, but satisfies the relation [81]
Φˆs(ωh) =
N−1∑
τ=−(N−1)
Rˆs(τ)e
−jωhτ .
Let Rs(τ) = E{s(k)s(k − τ)′}. Then there holds
E{Φˆs(ωh)} =
N−1∑
τ=−(N−1)
(
1− |τ |
N
)
Rs(τ)e
−jωhτ .
So the biased ACS estimate has a windowing effect on average.
The unbiased ACS estimate has a different form given by
Rˆs(τ) =
1
N − τ
N∑
k=τ+1
s(k)s(k − τ)′, 0 ≤ τ < N. (4.15)
The use of unbiased ACS estimate suggests a more sophisticated estimation method that
introduces the windowing technique by taking the PSD estimate at frequency ωh as
Φˆs(ωh) =
N−1∑
τ=−(N−1)
win(τ)Rˆs(τ)e
−jωhτ . (4.16)
The above covers the case of the biased ACS estimate in a special case in the average
sense. Commonly used windows include Barlett, Hanning, Hamming, Blackman, and Kaiser
windows. Each has its advantages and disadvantages, which will not be discussed here.
Capon algorithm
Capon algorithm is more sophisticated than the nonparametric method for spectrum es-
timation in that a specific optimization is carried out in the estimation process. Assume
that the value of Φw(ωh) in (4.6) is very different from that in (4.7). Quite a few spectrum
estimation methods can be employed to estimate Φw(ωh). The one attracting our attention
is the Capon algorithm [82]. Our description in this subsection is based on the book [81]
(page 232 - 238).
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For convenience assume that s(k) has dimension 1 at each time index k. Denote
a(ω) =

1
e−jω
...
e−jℓω

, s(k) =

s(k)
s(k − 1)
...
s(k − ℓ)

, h =

h0
h1
...
hℓ

where (ℓ+1) is the window size. Let Rs = E{s(k)w(k)′}. Then the Capon algorithm seeks to
synthesize the estimate of PSD Φs(ω) through solving the following optimization problem:
min
h
h′Rsh subject to h
′a(ω) = 1. (4.17)
It can be easily seen that
sF (k) =
ℓ∑
i=0
his(k − i) = h′s(k).
It admits the mean power E{|sF (k)|2} = h′Rsh. The constrained minimization in (4.17)
seeks to minimize the total power subject to the constraint that the filter pass the frequency
ω undistorted.
For its application to our problem, ω = ωh and Rs can be estimated via
Rs ≈ Rk0 :=
1
N + 1
k0∑
k=k0−N
s(k)s(k)′
at time k where N > ℓ. That is, the sample size for estimating covariance Rs needs to be
greater than the window size. Two versions of the Capon estimator (CM) are given by
CM1 : Φ̂s(ωh) =
ℓ+ 1
a(ωh)∗R
−1
k0
a(ωh)
,
CM2 : Φ̂s(ωh) =
a(ωh)
∗R−1k0 a(ωh)
a(ωh)∗R
−2
k0
a(ωh)
.
Note that the covariance matrix R can also be calculated based on the a priori information
on d(k), η(k), and the models of P (z) and K(z). Extension to the vector case or m > 1 can
take each entry of a(ω) multiple of identity of dimension m and replacing the inverse in CMi
by matrix inverse.
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A disadvantage of the Capon algorithm is that the spectrum estimation is a nonlinear
function of the signal w(k), and thus distribution of w(k) is more difficult to analyze. How-
ever it often outperforms the nonparametric method due to its optimization nature. More
importantly it has very close relation to other widely used methods such as autoregressive
(AR) method (CM1). Its weakness in resolution is not of great concern to us because the
frequency ωh is already known to us.
4.2.2 Detection algorithm
As discussed above, at frequency wh, the PSD can be significantly different from that in
absence of replay attack. So, it is possible to improve the detect rate of the replay attack by
analyze the PSD at frequency wh. As many practical control systems are required to have
infinity gain at wh = 0 in order to have zero steady-state error for tracking step inputs, we
will focus on analyzing the PSD at zero frequency wh = 0. Thus, for the given signal samples
{s(k)}, the simplest way to estimate the PSD at zero frequency with a specified window size
(ℓ+ 1) at time k becomes
Φˆs(0; k) =
1
ℓ+ 1
∣∣∣∣∣
k∑
i=k−ℓ
s(i)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
∣∣∣∣∣ 1√ℓ+ 1
k∑
i=k−ℓ
s(i)
∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (4.18)
Because all exogenous signals {d(k), ηo(k), ηc(k)} are AWGN, the random variable
sℓ(k) =
1√
ℓ+ 1
k∑
i=k−ℓ
s(i)
is also Gauss distributed with the same mean and covariance as s(k). Hence the PSD estimate
for ωh = 0 at time index (k +N) is given by
Φˆs(0; k) = |sℓ(k)|2
and has a Rayleigh distribution. Let the hypothesis H0 be the case in absence of the replay
attack, and the hypothesis H1 be the case in presence of the replay attack. Then the detection
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algorithm is given by
H0 : Φˆs(0) < τ,
H1 : Φˆs(0) > τ,
for some threshold τ > 0. If the variance of s(k) is known for both the case of the absence
and presence of the replay attack, then τ can be determined to satisfy the given false alarm
rate.
To improve the detection rate, the Capon algorithm can be implemented to estimate the
PSD of {s(k)}. Thus at frequency wh = 0, we have
a(0) =

1
1
...
1

, s(k) =

s(k)
s(k − 1)
...
s(k − ℓ)

, Rk :=
1
N + 1
k∑
i=k−N
s(i)s(i)′
where N ≥ ℓ. In this case the Capon estimator (CM) becomes
CM1 : Φ̂s(0) =
ℓ+ 1
a(0)∗R−1k0 a(0)
, (4.19)
CM2 : Φ̂w(0) =
a(0)∗R−1k0 a(0)
a(0)∗R−2k0 a(0)
. (4.20)
Our simulation results in the next section show that the Capon estimator indeed improves
the detection rate for replay attacks.
4.3 Simulation and Conclusion
In this section we present some simulation results for detection of the replay attack using
the spectrum estimation method. The control system under consideration is the same as the
first system model in Chapter 3. Signal s(k) is used in this simulation study. We use the
conventional method (4.18) and the Capon method (4.19) to estimate the PSD of s(k) at
ωh = 0. We again assume that the feedback system is in the steady-state prior to the replay
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attack, and the replay attack is launched at k = 250Ts. For the conventional method, fix the
false alarm rate at 5%, and use different window size by set (ℓ+ 1) = 5, 10, 20 and 50. The
resulting detection rate is shown next.
250 300 350 400 450 500
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
Time(k)
D
et
ec
tio
n 
R
at
e
Figure 4.1: Detection rate by using conventional method with different window size
In the above figure, we set the window sizes equal to 5, 10, 20 and 50, respectively. The
vertical axis represents the detection rate while the horizontal axis giving the time samples.
The red solid line shows the detection rate when the window size is equal to 5; The blue dash
dot line shows the detection rate when the window size is 10; The black dot line shows the
detection rate when the window size is equal to 20; The purple dash line shows the detection
rate when the window size is equal to 50.
The detection rate is obtained by taking the average of 10,000 ensembles under the false
alarm rate of 5%. The detection rate varies for different window sizes. It grows as the window
size increases. For each window size, the detection rate grows as time increases. The detection
rate curve start at 250Ts with 5% detection rate. The detection latency is about 200Ts that
seems to be constant with respect to the window size. When the window size is equal to 5,
the curve reaches 19% detection rate; When the window size is equal to 10, the detection
rate increases to 29%; When the window size is equal to 20, the detection rate reaches 43%;
When the window size is equal to 50, the detection rate reaches 63%.
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To improve the detection rate and shorten the latency, we scale the system by set P (z) =
P (z)/5 and K(z) = 5K(z) separately. This is commonly used in engineering practice and
does not change the system performance. The detection rate for the scaled system is shown
below.
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Figure 4.2: Detection rate of scaled system by using conventional method
In the above figure, we again set the window sizes equal to 5, 10, 20 and 50, respectively.
The vertical axis represent the detection rate while the horizontal axis giving the time sam-
ples. The red solid line shows the detection rate when the window size is equal to 5; The
blue dash dot line shows the detection rate when the window size is 10; The black dot line
shows the detection rate when the window size is equal to 20; The purple dash line shows
the detection rate when the window size is equal to 50.
The detection rate is again obtained by taking the average of 10,000 ensembles under
the false alarm rate of 5%. For different window sizes, the detection rate curves vary. The
detection rate curves start at 250Ts with 5% detection rate. The detection latency seems
to have increased more than 100Ts for all the cases. When the window size is equal to 5,
the detection rate reaches 57%; When the window size is equal to 10, the detection rate
reaches 71%; When the window size is equal to 20, the detection rate reaches 80%; When
the window size is equal to 50, the detection rate reaches 89%. Compare with the unscaled
system model, the detection rate is significantly improved.
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In comparison with the whitening filter approach with the window size equal to 5, the
detection rate is 14% higher than the result obatined using the whitening filter approach (Fig.
3.6) under the same detection latency. It also shows that the 40% detection rate is reached
with latency of 65Ts, which is 25% less than 100Ts using the whitening filter approach (Fig.
3.6).
We also used Capon algorithm for detection of the replay attack, which outperforms the
conventional non-parametric method as presented above. Our simulation result shows that
by using the scaled system model, it is possible to increase the detection rate and shorten
the latency further. Our simulation study is carried out for using the Capon algorithm with
the same fixed window size (ℓ+1) = 5 under the same false alarm rate of 5%. The detection
rate using the Capon method is shown next.
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Figure 4.3: Detection rate by using capon method
The detection rate is obtained by taking the average of 10,000 ensembles under the false
alarm rate of 5%. The detection rate curve starts with 5% at time = 250Ts at which the
replay attack is launched. After about latency of 150Ts, the detection rate reaches more than
60% that is 5% higher than that of the conventional method (Fig. 4.2), and 22% higher than
the whitening filter approach (Fig. 3.6). When the same detection rate reaches 40%, the
latency is 50Ts, which is 23% less than 65Ts by using conventional method (Fig. 4.2) and
50% less than 100Ts by using the whitening filter approach (Fig. 3.6).
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To compare our detection performance with the results in the existing literature [2], we
use both conventional and Capon methods to test the model in [2]. For the conventional
method, we assume that the replay attack is launched at 250Ts, and set up the window sizes
equal to 5, 10, 20 and 50, respectively. The simulation results of the detection rate are shown
next.
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Figure 4.4: Detection rate of model [2] by using conventional method
In the above figure, the vertical axis represents the detection rate while the horizontal axis
giving the time samples. The red solid line shows the detection rate when the window size
is equal to 5; The blue dash dot line shows the detection rate when the window size is 10;
The black dot line shows the detection rate when the window size is equal to 20; The purple
dash line shows the detection rate when the window size is equal to 50. The detection rate
is obtained by taking the average of 10,000 ensembles under the false alarm rate of 5%. The
curve starts at 250Ts with 5% detection rate. Let us examine the case of latency = 200Ts
next. When the window size is equal to 5, the detection rate reaches 63%; When the window
size is equal to 10, the detection rate reaches 78%; When the window size is equal to 20, the
detection rate reaches 86%; When the window size is equal to 50, the detection rate reaches
92%. For the case when the window size is equal to 5, the detection rate is almost 50% higher
than that obtained by using Mo and Sinopoli’s method [2]. To improve the detection rate,
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The Capon method is used for replay attack detection with window size (ℓ+ 1) = 5. The
detection rate curve is shown next.
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Figure 4.5: Detection rate of model [2] by using Capon method
The detection rate is obtained by taking the average of 10000 examples. The false alarm
rate is set to 5%, and replay attack is launched at 250Ts. The detection rate is 66%, which
is 5% more than that using the conventional method (figure 4.4). At 40% detection rate,
the latency is 11Ts, which is 21% smaller than the case of using the conventional method
(figure 4.4). In comparison with the result in [2], it shows that the latency by using the
spectrum estimation approach is greater. The reason lies in the fact the filter V (q)−1 in 4.13
is IIR filter which induces large time delay when filtering the signal. However the saturated
detection rate is is much higher than that in [2].
The results for the above example show that the spectrum estimation approach at some
special frequency is more effective than the whitening filter approach for replay attack detec-
tion. It significantly improves the detection rate and also shortens the latency. By using the
Capon estimator, the detection rate improves more than 30% compared to the result of the
whitening filter approach. Also the latency is reduced by half. Thus the spectrum estimation
approach is an effective way to improve the detection performance for replay attacks.
To recap this chapter, we introduced the spectrum estimation approach and proved that
at some specific frequency the PSD of filtered signal s(k) under replay attack is significantly
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different from that in absence of replay attacks. Motivated by this fact, both nonparametric
estimation method and the Capon method are employed to estimate the PSD for the detec-
tion of the replay attacks. Simulation results are presented to show that these two estimation
methods can effectively improve the detection rate and shorten the latency for replay attack
detection.
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5 Conclusion
SCADA system is widely used in many different industries. It is also an essential part and
plays a crucial role in monitoring and controlling the power grid. As the expansion of the
power grid, efficiency issue and high cost issue arise which require the power grid to evolution.
With the advent of the SCADA technology, it now is feasible to build the next generation
of power grid – smart grid. With the implement of the smart grid, it will improve the
power supply efficiency and reduce power lost, and make the power system more reliable and
greener. However due to many sites over large distance and use of information technology,
especially wireless communications and networking, SCADA systems give rise to the security
problem making the smart grid vulnerable to penetration and malicious attacks that become
a dominant research problem in developing the smart grid. Once the adversaries gain access
to the power control network, they can perform a wide range of attacks. Possible attack
actions can be separated into two groups and thus pose two major challenges. One is to take
control of the target region system for future crime actions. It is based on cyber system and
can be solved by the cyber security approach. The other one is to modify data or inject
malicious data into control systems overseen by the SCADAs. Such attacks can bypass the
cyber security, and poses more serious danger to the smart grid. This dissertation is focused
on the second type of attacks comprising in particular the unobservable attack, and the
replay attack. Although both are studied in the existing literature, the solutions are not
satisfactory which motivates this dissertation research, as presented in the previous three
chapters. Our results provide viable solution approaches to both the unobservable attack and
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the replay attack, validated by our simulation studies. This conclusion chapter summarizes
the contribution of this dissertation and in addition discusses the possible future research
directions on the security problem of the smart grid.
5.1 Dissertation Contributions
This dissertation is aimed at solving the detection problems for two major threads to
the smart grid: the unobservable attack and the replay attack, introduced and dwelled in
Chapter 1. Our contributions to these two detection problems are summarized next:
• In Chapter 2, we propose a consensus dynamic estimation approach. We assume that
the power system is described by a linear DC power flow model and is operating in a
quasi-steady state. Each bus load is considered as an individual agent with different
state-space model and state vector dimension. The simplest case is when the dynamic
model is described by the random walk Markov process. Then we formulate the detec-
tion problem into the dynamic estimation rather than static estimation problem, which
is in fact a distributed estimation problem in the sense of consensus. The reason lies
in the fact that the existing conventional detection methods are based on static state
estimation which is only related to the present measurement information. It can be
bypassed by unobservable attacks. In contrast the dynamic state estimation is related
to both the present measurement information and the past system states. It can help
to validate the data as the states are predicted one more time against the measurement
samples. The latest results from the consensus control and the positive real concept
are extended to discrete-time multi-agent systems, and a distributed estimation algo-
rithm is derived distributed estimation algorithm in this dissertation. The distributed
consensus estimation is developed based on the local dynamic model for each bus.
So it is possible to monitor the dynamic status in each bus. Contrasting to conven-
tional estimation method, the consensus method can not only detect the existence of
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unobservable attacks but also detect which agent data is modified by adversary. There-
fore by using the consensus dynamic approach, unobservable attacks can be effectively
detected, which are validated by our extensive simulation studies.
• This dissertation proposes two different new approaches to tackle the detection problem
for replay attacks. Contrasting to the existing methods that employ injection of white
Gauss noises to the control signal and deteriorate the control system performance,
we make use of the communication noise induced by the digital network and wireless
channels commonly seen in SCADA systems. Two different solution approaches are
proposed without injecting the white Gauss noises to the control signal, yet effective
for detecting the replay attacks. Our contributions are described next.
– In Chapter 3, we propose a whitening filter approach. Specifically the received
signal transmitted from the plant model to the controller has a smaller noise vari-
ance under the normal operation in absence of the replay attack than in presence
of the replay attack. The reason lies in the fact that the replayed signal contains
the channel noise in the past uncorrelated to the present channel noise. To high-
light this variance difference, a filter is employed to whiten the feedback signal
received at the controller input, assuming no replay attack. The filtered signal
becomes nonwhite with a greater variance when the replay attack is launched.
Hence we are able to detect the replay attack based on the whitening feedback
signal without sacrificing the control system performance compared to the exist-
ing results in the literature. In addition our approach is applicable to any stable
feedback control systems, because there is no assumed Kalman filter in the feed-
back controller as in the LQG control system although our results apply to the
LQG control system as well. The simulations shows that this solution approach
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is effective but it comes with large latency due to the use of the whitening filter
that is IIR in general.
Although the whitening filter approach works, it may fail if the PSD of filtered
signal is close to 1 over majority of the frequency samples when a replay attack
takes place. In this case the PSD of filtered signal is not far away from being
white, and may result in high probability of detection errors. On the other hand,
it is possible that the PSD of filtered signal is far away from unity at some specific
frequency samples. This fact motivates us to propose another detection method
as described next.
– In Chapter 4, we propose the spectrum estimation approach. First we analyze
the PSD of the feedback signal and its filtered version, and find some particular
frequency samples at which its PSD is small under the normal operation in ab-
sence of the replay attack but become large in presence of the replay attack. In
fact the PSD of the filtered signal at these frequency samples is unity in absence
of the replay attack and becomes significantly greater than the unity in presence
of the replay attack. The set of these frequency samples is not empty due to the
stability and performance requirement for the underlying control system. By es-
timating the PSD of the filtered signal at these frequency samples, we are able
to detect the presence of the replay attack by setting the appropriate threshold
determined by the false alarm rate. Both nonparametric estimation method and
the Capon method are employed to estimate the PSD at these frequency sam-
ples. Our simulation results show that the spectrum estimation approach at some
specific frequencies is more effective than the whitening filter approach in terms
of the detection rate for replay attacks. Both these two methods can effectively
improve the detection rate and shorten the latency for detection of the replay
attack.
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5.2 Future Direction
In this dissertation, we propose new solution approaches to the unobservable attack and
replay attack threatening the SCADA systems. These two approaches are shown effective,
validated by the simulation studies. However the work on security of the smart grid and
SCADA systems is far away from over. In the following, we highlight our point of views for
future research in security against the unobservable attack and replay attack.
Unobservable Attacks
Although our proposed solution approach is effective, there are still some inadequacies
that need to addressed in the future.
• This dissertation has assumed that the phase angles in the power system are approx-
imately decoupled in order to simply the problem. It is important to note that the
phase angles may not be decoupled, and the cross product terms may not be negligible
in practice. While we believe that the coupling among different phase angles are weak
during the normal operation of the power grid, further qualitative and quantitative
studies are necessary. If our intuition is correct, some analysis is needed to show the
approximate decoupling among the phase angles. Otherwise we need to find a remedy
to our assumption on the approximate decoupling.
• This dissertation has proposed consensus estimation used to detect the unobservable
attack and shown to be effective. However there is no optimal consensus estimation
is not studied. Since positive real property in the continuous-time case corresponds to
optimal estimation, it will be interesting to find out if there is a similar connection. In
the least current consensus estimation algorithm ensures only stability of the estima-
tor, which may be inadequate in many other applications. This can be a good future
research topic.
Replay Attacks
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For the replay attack, two effective approaches are proposed in this dissertation to detect
the replay attack. However the research work in this problem area is far from over due to the
imminent threat of the replay attack. We point out a few future directions in this problem
area next.
• Although additive white Gauss noise (AWGN) channels are widely used in wireless
communications, other network distortions also exist in the networked control systems
common in SCADAs. This dissertation has not studied other network distortions dif-
ferent than the AWGN channel. For instance, we are not sure if the packet drops and
quantization errors at the plant input and output can be effectively used for detection
of the replay attack. Both are difficult to analyze statistically, and are lack of the nice
features in the AWGN channel.
• Our two solution approaches reply on filtering of the feedback signal. Because the
filter has infinite impulse response (IIR) in general, it induces the latency causing the
time delay in detecting the replay attack. How to reduce the detection latency poses
a significant challenge. At present we are not sure if more advanced PSD estimation
methods can help to improve detection rate and shorten the latency.
The security problem in smart grid with SCADA system is complex and challenging. Our
proposed approaches are just only one of the initial attempts to tackle the attack detection
problems. We hope that our contributions in this dissertation speed up the research activity
and solving the security issues in smart grid security issues.
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